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I. Introduction
The year 2006 was a busy and interesting one for international arbitration. The first
section of this report focuses on U.S. federal court developments in the arena of domestic
arbitration (where such developments may be relevant to international arbitration), as well
as several cases involving international arbitrations. In 2006, the federal courts, including
the United States Supreme Court, continued to reaffirm the strong federal policy favoring
arbitration, while increasingly showing impatience with spurious challenges to arbitration
awards. In addition, the federal courts continued to wrestle with their gatekeeper func-
tion, in which they are charged with determining whether a particular dispute is subject to
arbitration. Developments also occurred in the areas of arbitrator challenges and class
arbitration.
Next, the focus shifts to developments in the investor-state arena. In 2006, there were a
significant number of jurisdictional and merits decisions in cases decided under bilateral
investment treaties (BIT), as well as one significant decision in a case decided under the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Although BIT arbitration remains a
relatively recent phenomenon, BIT arbitration may be showing some signs of maturation
as BIT tribunals are able to build on an accumulating body of experience in interpreting
the existing BITs. For example, some of the issues that were hot topics two or three years
ago, such as the meaning of fork in the road clauses, seemed to be less controversial in
2006. Nevertheless, new topics, such as the implications of most-favored-nations clauses,
attracted considerable attention in 2006.
Finally, we report on some significant institutional changes relating to arbitration, in-
cluding rule changes by various bodies, modifications to the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law, and the entry into force of the
Central America-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA).
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H. Arbitration Developments in U.S. Courts
A. INTERPRETATION AND ENFORCEIMENT" OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES
1. Reaffirmation of Severability Principle and Arbitrators' Exclusive Authority to Determine
Validity of Contracts
In its only arbitration decision of 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court in Buckeye Check Cash-
ing v. Cardegna,I reaffirmed the severability principle, the principle that the arbitration
clause is severable from the rest of the contract in which it is found, and stressed that
arbitral tribunals have the exclusive authority to determine the validity of agreements con-
taining arbitration clauses. In Buckeye, plaintiffs brought a putative class action in Florida
state court alleging that Buckeye's check-cashing business charged usurious interest rates
and thereby violated state law. Buckeye moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitra-
tion provision in the plaintiffs' agreements with Buckeye. The trial court held that it was
the role of the court, rather than the arbitrator, to decide whether the contract was illegal
and void ab initio. The Florida Supreme Court ultimately agreed.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. It held that "a challenge to the validity of the con-
tract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause, must go to the arbitrator." 2
Relying on its landmark decisions in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing
Co. 3 and Southland Corp. v. Keating,4 the Court noted, first, that under Prima Paint the
arbitration clause was severable from the rest of the contract, regardless of state severabil-
ity law. Second, except where the arbitration clause itself is being challenged, the validity
of the contract as a whole is for the arbitrator to decide. Third, these basic propositions
apply equally in state and federal court, based on the broad commerce clause power that
Congress exercised in enacting the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).
According to the Court, this ruling "permits a court to enforce an arbitration agreement
in a contract that the arbitrator later finds to be void," while the opposite approach would
allow "a court to deny effect to an arbitration provision in a contract that the court later
finds to be perfectly reasonable." 5 Hence, the federal policy favoring arbitration can only
be honored by granting arbitrators the exclusive authority to determine contract validity.
2. Courts as Arbitration Gatekeepers
While the Supreme Court has consistently articulated and decided cases in light of the
federal policy favoring arbitration, it has in the past also noted the role of the courts in
acting as gatekeepers of the arbitral process. 6 The policy favoring arbitration does not go
so far as to permit courts to compel arbitration when the parties have not agreed to arbi-
trate. In 2006, courts continued to wrestle with factually complex cases in which it was
1. Buckeye Check Cashing v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 126 S. Ct. 1204, 1209 (2006).
2. Id. at 1210.
3. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 411 (1967).
4. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1984).
5. Buckeye, 126 S. Ct. at 1210.
6. See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83-84 (2002) (holding that despite the general
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, there is a small category of circumstances where parties would
have expected a court to decide this "gateway" question of arbitrability).
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not entirely clear whether the parties had agreed to arbitrate their dispute. As the cases
discussed immediately below demonstrate, the nature and extent of the required relation-
ship between an arbitration clause and a given dispute remains elusive and will undoubt-
edly continue to be an area of controversy in the future.
For example, in Wachovia Bank N.A. v. Schmidt,7 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
denied a petition to compel arbitration by a bank accused of fraudulently inducing an
investor's participation in a tax shelter. The bank acted as the investor's financial advisor
and also loaned him funds to use in connection with the transaction. The promissory note
used for the loan included an arbitration clause providing that either party could compel
arbitration with respect to "any claim or controversy arising out of, or relating to" the
note or other documents executed in connection with the loan.
But the Fourth Circuit saw the lending and advising relationships as distinct from one
another, and noted that the investor's claims "derive[d] exclusively from the adviser-ad-
visee relationship."" The court reasoned that the note did not bear a significant relation-
ship to the claims and, thus, the note's arbitration clause was not implicated in the dispute.
Similarly, although the court held that the warrant that the investor purchased as part of
the transaction also included an arbitration agreement, the warrant was only tangentially
related to the investor's claims against the bank.
Hence, in Wachovia, the Fourth Circuit determined that despite two broadly worded
arbitration clauses in documents connected to the underlying transaction in dispute, the
dispute was not arbitrable. In 2006, the Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals similarly found that arbitration clauses that are connected to, but not at the heart of
the dispute, were an inadequate basis to compel arbitration. 9
In contrast, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals compelled arbitration in a case where
the claims arguably arose under a contract containing an arbitration clause, despite the
fact the claims might also have arisen under a subsequent contract without an arbitration
clause. In Image Software, Inc. v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co.,l ° a computer software developer
granted a perpetual license to a distributor, and the parties agreed in that licensing agree-
ment to arbitrate any disputes. Two years later, the parties entered into a maintenance
agreement that did not include an arbitration agreement (and which did not entirely sup-
plant the earlier licensing agreement). At the time of the later maintenance agreement,
the distributor also obtained a newer version of the software.
7. Wachovia Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Schmidt, 445 F.3d 762 (4th Cir. 2006).
8. Id. at 768.
9. U.S. Small Bus. Admin. v. Chimicles, 447 F.3d 207 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding a receiver's claims against
an investment fund subscription agreement not subject to the arbitration clause of the fund's partnership
agreement); Suburban Leisure Ctr., Inc. v. AMF Bowling Prod., Inc., 468 F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding
claims based on earlier oral agreement not subject to the arbitration clause of a later written agreement
containing merger and integration clauses); Tittle v. Enron Corp., 463 F.3d 410 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that
a dispute among insureds about division of insurance policy proceeds is not subject to the arbitration clause in
the insurance contract that required arbitration of claims between insureds and insurer). Cf Lipton-U. City,
LLC v. Shurgard Storage Crts., Inc., 454 F.3d 934, 935 n.l (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that a clause providing
that if a purchase option was exercised the parties would arbitrate "additional terms ... not contemplated by"
the contract did not require the arbitration of a price term that had been contemplated by the contract but
rescinded by the court on the basis that there had been no meeting of the minds).
10. inage Software, Inc. v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co., 459 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2006).
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When a copyright and trade secrets dispute arose, the distributor moved to compel
arbitration under the licensing agreement. The developer objected, asserting that because
the newer software (purchased at the time of the maintenance agreement) was at issue, the
arbitration clause in the licensing agreement did not apply. Siding with the distributor,
the Tenth Circuit held that the dispute was subject to arbitration, since there was some
basis to conclude that the updated software was governed by the original licensing agree-
ment, not the later maintenance agreement.
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals compelled arbitration against a tax shelter
sponsor under an arbitration clause contained in a brokerage agreement. In Reddam v.
KPMG LLP,'l I the plaintiffs had adopted a program intended to minimize tax liabilities.
When the program did not work out as plaintiffs had anticipated, they sued the program's
developer, but not the securities broker that plaintiffs were referred to for transactions
related to the program. The contract between the plaintiffs and the broker included an
agreement to arbitrate disputes and indicated that arbitration would be governed by the
rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). When the developer
asserted that the dispute was arbitrable, the NASD refused to exercise jurisdiction over a
dispute where no named party was associated with the NASD. The Ninth Circuit held
that the arbitration agreement's language referencing the NASD rules was not integral to
the arbitration agreement. The district court had erred in concluding that the agreement
had become unenforceable and was directed to exercise jurisdiction over the dispute for
the purpose of appointing a substitute arbitrator.12
Notably, the conflict among the federal courts with respect to arbitrability does not
arise in cases involving clauses that are so defective or internally inconsistent that they
simply do not work. Marks 3-Zet-Ernst Marks GmbH & Co. KG v. Presstek, Inc. 13 is a good
example of that kind of case. In Marks, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit con-
fronted an arbitration clause that provided for "arbitration in the Hague under the Inter-
national Arbitration rules." The problem, of course, is that while there are plenty of
international arbitration rules provided by various institutions including the American Ar-
bitration Association (AAA), the London Court of International Arbitration, the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce, and others, there is no such thing as "the International
Arbitration rules" in general.
Marks first sought arbitration in the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in the
Hague. The PCA refused to hear the claim, reasoning that it was not clear that the parties
intended to invoke the UNCITRAL arbitration rules, the sole rules under which the PCA
would hear disputes. Marks then sued in U.S. federal court to compel the PCA to conduct
arbitration under the AAA international rules. Although not disagreeing that the AAA
rules may have been intended, the district court rejected Marks' claim primarily because
the PCA had already stated that it was competent to resolve only those cases brought
under the UNCITRAL rules, and thus, Marks was asking for relief-PCA arbitration
under AAA rules-that did not exist. The court of appeals affirmed, ruling that Marks'
11. Reddam v. KPMG LLP, 457 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2006).
12. See also ING Fin. Partners v. Johansen, 446 F.3d 777, 778 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that a broker's
employment agreement providing for arbitration of "any dispute ...in accordance with the rules of the
National Association of Security Dealers" was broad enough to permit arbitration of sex discrimination
claims despite fact that NASD rules themselves did not extend to such claims).
13. Marks 3 Zet-Ernst GmBh & Co. KG v. Presstek, Inc., 455 F.3d 7 (lst Cir. 2006).
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insistence on a nonexistent remedy constituted a waiver of its right to obtain a ruling on
any other theory that might have resulted in arbitration before an entity other than the
PCA.
3. Attempts to Arbitrate Against or by Non-Signatories
Problems of third-party enforcement continue to appear in a variety of contexts, with
the issue of equitable estoppel and related doctrines continuing to provide fertile grounds
for motions to compel arbitration against non-signatories to arbitration agreements. For
example, in Nitro Distributing, Inc. v. Alticor, Inc.,14 the Amway Corporation sought to
compel arbitration against non-signatories when it was sued by businesses that were oper-
ated by its distributors, but that had not signed the arbitration agreements in effect be-
tween the distributors and Amway. Amway sought to compel arbitration on two grounds:
first, that the businesses should be estopped from rejecting arbitration, as they had bene-
fited from Amway's contracts with its distributors (contracts that included an arbitration
clause); and second, that the distributors and the plaintiff businesses constituted a commu-
nity of interest and therefore were equally governed by the arbitration clause. The Eighth
Circuit rejected Amway's estoppel arguments because the businesses benefited only indi-
rectly from the contract containing the arbitration clauses. The court also rejected the
community of interest theory, holding that the theory applies only where a non-signatory
attempts to bind a signatory to an arbitration agreement, not the reverse. As the court
observed, "[a]rbitration is strictly a matter of contract; if the parties have not agreed to
arbitrate, the courts have no authority to mandate that they do so." Is
The Fourth Circuit decision in American Bankers Insurance Group v. Long illustrates the
reverse case, that is, the circumstances under which a non-signatory may successfully as-
sert estoppel to compel a signatory to arbitrate claims against the non-signatory.16 Plain-
tiffs in Long claimed to have been sold an allegedly fraudulent promissory note as part of
an automobile insurance scheme structured by A-BIG, the underwriter. The promissory
note was incorporated by reference into an agreement between plaintiffs and the insurer,
which contained an arbitration clause. ABIG, as the underwriter, had not signed the
agreement. When plaintiffs brought suit, the court of appeals agreed with ABIG that
plaintiffs should be equitably estopped from denying that they were bound by the arbitra-
tion clause. Plaintiffs' claims relied on the terms of the note because their claims were
based on ABIG's alleged breach of a duty assigned to it in the note. Plaintiffs could not
seek both to enforce the agreement's duties and to deny its arbitration clause.
4. Court Alteration of Arbitration Clauses in the Face of Limitations on Arbitration Due to
Statutory Rigbts, Public Policy, and Related Grounds
One of the few reasons why courts may deny an otherwise applicable arbitration clause
is that the clause is illegal or somehow conflicts with public policy. In the past, courts
have refused to enforce arbitration clauses in circumstances where, for example, individual
14. Nitro Distrib., Inc. v. Alticor, Inc., 453 F.3d 995 (8th Cir. 2006).
15. Id. at 999 (quoting Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 64 F.3d 773, 779 (2d Cir. 1995)).
16. Am. Bankers Ins. Group, Inc. v. Long, 453 F.3d 623 (4th Cir. 2006).
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employees would likely be unable to afford the costs of arbitration and hence would be
deprived of any forum in which to assert claims. 17
In 2006, the First Circuit took up this issue when considering contracts of adhesion
between a cable service provider and its subscribers. In Kristian v. Comcast Corp.,Is the
subscribers sued the provider, Comcast, alleging that they were paying inflated prices as
the result of anticompetitive practices that would violate state and federal antitrust laws.
Although the contracts at issue contained arbitration clauses, the clauses provided for lim-
ited discovery, shortened the statute of limitations, prevented recovery of treble damages
and attorney's fees, and prohibited class mechanisms, all in conflict with the plaintiffs'
statutory rights. The plaintiffs contended that their arbitration agreements with Comcast
should be invalidated because of this conflict.
Looking to recent Supreme Court precedent, notably Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 19 the First Circuit determined that it could consider the effect of the challenged pro-
visions on plaintiffs' rights. It concluded that the bar on recovery of treble damages and
attorney's fees conflicted with the clear statutory language of federal antitrust law. The
bar on class arbitration, while not in direct conflict with antitrust law, was at odds with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and foreclosed what was the only realistic method for
plaintiffs to advance their claims without facing prohibitive litigation costs.
The court nevertheless did not bar arbitration. Instead, it found that although these
limitations on the nature of relief available in arbitration were unenforceable, such limita-
tions could be severed based on the arbitration agreement's savings clause. The court
accordingly held that the arbitration could proceed, so long as it proceeded on a class basis
and with plaintiffs having the right to seek treble damages and attorney's fees.
Kristian joins other recent cases in imposing arbitration with different procedural and
substantive contours than is actually set forth in the arbitration clause or clauses at issue.
To date these cases have arisen in domestic cases, in cases involving contracts of adhesion,
and in circumstances where the costs of arbitrating would be prohibitive. 20 It remains to
be seen if this reasoning extends into international arbitration, with the risks of imposing
rules and practices on foreign parties and arbitrators-particularly regarding class ac-
tions-with which they have no or limited familiarity because those rules and practices are
unknown in their home countries.
17. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., 298 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2002) (one-sided arbitration
agreement that required employee to share costs was unenforceable); Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Mgmt. of
Colorado, Inc., 163 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 1999) (arbitration agreement requiring employee to pay portion of
arbitrator's fees was unenforceable).
18. Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006).
19. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002). The First Circuit also looked to Pacificare
Health Systems, Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003), and Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444
(2003), to inform its application of Howsam.
20. See, e.g., Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 323 U.S. App. D.C. 133 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (interpreting arbitra-
tion agreement to require employer to pay arbitration fees); DeOrnellas v. Aspen Square Mgmt., Inc., 295 F.
Supp. 2d 753 (D. Mich. 2003) (enforcing arbitration agreement but severing provisions that limited remedies,
shared costs, and allowed employer to pick the location of the hearing).
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5. Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy proceedings present another opportunity for collision between arbitration
clauses and public policy considerations. Among other things, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
consolidates all creditor claims, provides an alternative set of procedures to address claims,
and gives debtors and courts power to repudiate certain not fully performed contracts.
Nevertheless, in 2006, two courts of appeals held that bankruptcy courts are limited in
their ability to override arbitration agreements. In Mintze v. American Financial Services,
Inc., 21 a lender sought to compel arbitration based on a clause in the loan agreement,
where a Chapter 13 debtor sought to enforce an earlier rescission of that loan agreement.
The Third Circuit held that, under the standard set out in Shearson/American Express, Inc.
v. McMahon,22 where an otherwise applicable arbitration clause exists, a bankruptcy court
lacks the authority and discretion to refuse its enforcement, unless congressional intent to
preclude waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue were shown. Here,
there was no evidence of such congressional intent, and furthermore, there was no conflict
between arbitration of the dispute and the Bankruptcy Code, as the debtor's statutory
claims arose from consumer protection laws and not from the Bankruptcy Code.
In a similar case, the Second Circuit held that a bankruptcy court does not have the
discretion to override an arbitration agreement unless it finds a serious conflict between
the relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and the FAA, or that arbitration of the
claim would necessarily jeopardize the objectives of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.2 3 The
court found no such conflict where a creditor sought to stay a Chapter 7 debtor's proceed-
ing against it and compel arbitration. The debtor's bankruptcy case had been fully admin-
istered and her debts discharged, so she no longer required the protection of the
Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provision. Furthermore, arbitration was a competent
forum for the interpretation and enforcement of Section 362(h) of the Bankruptcy Code,
on which her claim was based.
B. ARBITRATOR CHALLENGES
Perhaps the biggest news in 2006 for U.S. courts considering arbitrator challenges was
the Fifth Circuit decision in Positive Software Solutions v. New Century Mortgage and its
subsequent grant of rehearing en banc. 24 After an arbitrator's ruling in favor of New
Century, the losing party discovered that the arbitrator and his former law firm had previ-
ously, in an unrelated matter, been co-counsel with one of the law firms representing New
Century. The partner representing New Century in the arbitration was also personally
involved in the earlier matter. New Century claimed that the partner's personal involve-
ment in the earlier matter had ended before the arbitrator's involvement began, and that
the two individuals had never met. But their names did appear together on some plead-
ings, and court opinions listed each as co-counsel at an even later date. The arbitrator had
not disclosed these facts, nor offered any explanation for the nondisclosure.
21. Mintze v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., 434 F.3d 222, 226-27 (3d Cir. 2006).
22. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
23. MBNA Am. Bank v. Hill, 436 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2006).
24. Positive Software Solutions v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 436 F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 2006), reb'g en
bancgranted, 449 F.3d 616.
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Upon discovering these facts, Positive Software moved to have the award vacated for
evident partiality under the FAA.25 The meaning of the evident partiality standard is dis-
puted,26 and the Fifth Circuit had not previously addressed it directly. Both parties in
Positive Software looked to the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Commonwealth Coatings
Corp. v. Continental Casualty. Co., which set out the "the simple requirement that arbitra-
tors disclose to the parties any dealings that might create an impression of possible bias,"
thereby implying that evidence of actual bias was not necessary for vacatur.2 7 The major-
ity in Commonwealth Coatings had stated that it
ha[d] no doubt that if a litigant could show that a foreman of a jury or a judge in a
court of justice had, unknown to the litigant, any such relationship, the judgment
would be subject to challenge.... [Wie should, if anything, be even more scrupulous
to safeguard the impartiality of arbitrators than judges, since the former have com-
pletely free rein to decide the law as well as the facts and are not subject to appellate
review. 28
New Century pointed to Justice White's concurring opinion in Commonwealth Coatings,
which set forth a narrower test for when disclosure is required. Justice White asserted
that arbitrators should not to be held to the same high standards as Article III judges.29
He rephrased the court's holding as requiring that an arbitrator disclose when he or she
"has a substantial interest in a firm which has done more than trivial business with a
party." 30 Based on Justice White's opinion, other courts of appeals, notably the Second
Circuit, have endorsed the view that something more than an appearance of bias is needed
to disqualify an arbitrator.31
A Fifth Circuit three-judge panel rejected this interpretation and held that an arbitrator
"displays evident partiality by the very failure to disclose facts that might create a reasona-
ble impression of the arbitrator's partiality. The evident partiality is demonstrated from
the nondisclosure, regardless of whether actual bias is established."32 Acknowledging that
this disclosure rule was demanding, the court reasoned that requiring disclosure as a con-
dition to enforceability would minimize the role of courts in evaluating potential conflicts,
minimize the discretion of arbitrators, and underscore the importance of adherence to the
disclosure rules of the AAA. The AAA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial
Disputes provides in pertinent part that "[p]ersons who are requested to serve as arbitra-
tors should, before accepting, disclose: . . .(2) Any existing or past financial, business,
25. 9 U.S.C.A. § 10 (2006).
26. See, e.g., Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994) (adopting "reasonable impression of
partiality" standard for nondisclosure cases); Middlesex Mutual Ins. Co. v. Levine, 675 F.2d 1197, 1201 (1 lIth
Cir. 1982) (adopting "reasonable impression of partiality" standard); Morelite Constr. Corp. v. New York
City District Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that more than mere
'appearance of bias" is needed to vacate arbitration award); Peoples Security Life Ins. Co. v. Monumental
Life Ins., 991 F.2d 141, 146 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding "a mere appearance of bias is insufficient to demonstrate
evident partiality").
27. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
28. Id. at 148.
29. Id. at 150.
30. Id. at 151-52 (emphasis added).
31. Morelite, 748 F.2d 79.
32. Positive Software Solutions, 436 F.3d at 502.
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professional, family or social relationships which are likely to affect impartiality or which
might reasonably create any appearance of partiality or bias." 33 This decision puts the
Fifth Circuit in line with the Ninth Circuit, which endorsed a similar standard in Schmitz
v. Zilveti.
34
But the panel decision stands in contrast to the International Bar Association Guidelines
on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, which specifically provide that an
arbitrator need not disclose that he and counsel for one of the parties have previously
served together as co-counsel. 35 In addition, New Century raised concerns that such a
lenient standard for vacating arbitral awards will disqualify too many attorneys from acting
as arbitrators. The court attempted to deflect this criticism by pointing out that what is
required is not disqualification but rather disclosure. That argument is somewhat unsatis-
fying. If the underlying relationship is not indicative of bias such that it could be the basis
for disqualification, why should an arbitrator be penalized for failure to disclose it? It
remains to be seen whether the court will change its approach in its en banc decision.
Positive Softwiare was relied on heavily in the motion to vacate filed by claimants in
another arbitrator disclosure case, Sturm v. Citigroup, Inc.36 After losing an arbitration in
which Sturm claimed over $900 million in damages arising out of Citigroup's brokerage
services and its relationship to the WorldCom fraud, Sturm moved to vacate the award
because one of the arbitrators had not disclosed a number of indirect connections to the
parties or the fact that he had allegedly played a role in a securities fraud committed by a
previous employer.37 The case was dismissed after the parties settled out of court, and the
terms of the settlement have not been disclosed.
Although the standard for evident partiality may be uncertain, some relationships are
almost certainly too tenuous to support a motion to vacate an arbitration award-even if
those relationships are not disclosed. For instance, in another challenge involving Ci-
tigroup, the court was asked to vacate an award in favor of Citigroup because the tribunal
33. Id. at 502-03.
34. Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 1994).
35. COUNCIL OF THE IN-InERNAIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, INT1ERNAIIONAL BAR AssOcIATION GUln)-
LINES ON CONFLICIS OF INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION § 4.4.2 (May 22, 2004), available at
http://www.ibanet.org/images/downloads/guidelines%20text.pdf.
36. Civ. No. 1:06-cv-00290-PSF-MJW (D. Colo. 2006).
37. Sturm's allegations were as follows:
1. After his appointment as an arbitrator in this case, Arbitrator Drennen and his employer re-
ceived a lucrative underwriting engagement to take public a company represented by Rogers &
Hardin LLP, a law firm heavily involved in the coordinated defense of WorldCom research fraud
cases for Respondents. 2. That an investor had brought a securities fraud lawsuit against Dren-
nen. 3. That Arbitrator Drennen had been employed by Jones & Keller PC, which had regularly
represented defendants in securities arbitration matters and had represented Respondent Ci-
tigroup, Inc. 4. The true nature and extent of Arbitrator Drennen's relationship with Harrison
Douglas, Inc., a securities broker-dealer. 5. That Arbitrator Drennen's law partner had been
involved in a dispute in which the SEC alleged a stock valuation method he created was
fraudulent.
Movant/Arbitration Claimants' Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award, at 4. Sturm later amended their motion
to include the allegation that "Arbitrator Drennen Failed to Disclose that his Conduct was an Issue in an
Arbitration Against Cohig & Associates, Inc., a broker-dealer, in which the Arbitration Panel Found Cohig
Liable for Securities Fraud and Awarded Punitive Damages." Movant/Arbitration Claimants' Amended Mo-
tion to Vacate Arbitration Award, at 3.
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chairman sat on a country club's board of directors along with a manager of two Citigroup
offices. 38 The arbitrator had not disclosed that the country club was also one of his legal
clients, supposedly creating an incentive to favor Citigroup in order to retain the board's
approval of his legal representation of the club. The district court refused to vacate the
award based on purely "remote, uncertain, or speculative" evidence. 39
It remains the case that courts will not infer partiality merely from the absence of evi-
dence to support the award, 4° or vacate awards where there has been a trivial departure
from the parties' agreed-upon arbitrator qualifications. 41
C. ENFORCEMENTF AND ANNTULMENT OF AWARDS
1. Apparent Growing Impatience with Manifest Disregard Challenges to Arbitral Awards
A unique aspect of U.S. arbitration law is the persistence of the court-crafted manifest
disregard of law basis on which to vacate awards, in addition to the grounds expressly set
out in the New York Convention and the FAA. Although the manifest disregard doctrine
has attracted considerable attention and commentary over the years42 and is sometimes a
last-ditch attempt by a losing party to annul or delay enforcement of an award, courts have
actually annulled on that basis only rarely. 4 3
Recognizing this background, the Eleventh Circuit served notice that it would be in-
creasingly intolerant of spurious manifest disregard arguments. B. L. Harbert International
LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., involved a garden-variety construction scheduling dispute, an
award, and a motion to annul on manifest disregard grounds. The Eleventh Circuit saw
no merit in this strategy. In affirming the district court's refusal to annul, the court of
appeals identified only one reported case in the history of the circuit that had found mani-
fest disregard of the law. Moreover, the court found that the present set of facts did not
come within shouting distance44 of that earlier decision.
38. Thomason v. Citigroup Global Mkts., No. 2:05-CV-00883 PGC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3168 (D.
Utah 2006).
39. See also Weber v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d 545, 550 (N.D. Tex.
2006) (arbitrator disclosed membership in same country club as two potential witnesses, which relationship
did not satisfy "onerous burden" of actual bias).
40. Wise v. Wachovia Secs. LLC, 450 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 2006) (arbitrators' granting summary judgment
without explanation did not demonstrate corruption, partiality, or exceeding of powers).
41. Bulko v. Morgan Stanley DW Inc., 450 F.3d 622, 626 (5th Cit. 2006) (award by attorney on inactive
status not vacated despite NASD arbitration clause requiring arbitrator to be "an attorney ...or other
professional" who had devoted a certain percentage of time to securities-related work).
42. See, e.g., Hans Smit, The Time is Ripe for the U.S. Supreme Court to Bury the Misconceived Doctrine of
Manifest Disregard of the Law, 16 AM. REV. INrT'L ARR. 21 (2005); Noah Rubins, "Manifest Disregard of the
Law" and Vacantr of Arbitral Awards in the United States, 12 Am. REv. INT'L ARB. 363 (2001); Brad A. Gal-
braith, Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards in Federal Court: Contemplating the Use and Utility of the "Man-
ifest Disregard" of the Law Standard, 27 IND. L. Ra. 241 (1993).
43. Duferco Int'l Steel Trading v. T. Klaveness Shipping A/S, 333 F.3d 383, 389 (2d Cir. 2003)
("[O]btaining judicial relief for arbitrators' manifest disregard of the law is rare .... [S]ince 1960 we have
vacated some part of all of an arbitral award for manifest disregard in ... four out of at least 48 cases where
we applied the standard.").
44. See B.L. Harbert Int'l LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905, 911 (1lth Cir. 2006).
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The court also reflected on the laudatory goals of the FAA, which would be defeated "if
we permit parties who lose in arbitration to freely relitigate their cases in court."45 The
Court accordingly concluded with a warning to parties considering future challenges to
arbitration awards:
Courts cannot prevent parties from trying to convert arbitration losses into court
victories, but it may be that we can and should insist that if a party on the short end of
an arbitration award attacks that award in court without any real legal basis for doing
so, that party should pay sanctions.... The warning this opinion provides is that in
order to further the purposes of the FAA and to protect arbitration as a remedy we
are ready, willing, and able to consider imposing sanctions in appropriate cases.
46
2. Other Grounds for Vacating Awards
In 2006, there were a number of cases in which disappointed parties sought annulment
of awards. Among these cases was the closely watched GulfPetro Trading Co. v. Nigerian
National Petroleum Corp., a case involving an international arbitration. In that case, the
losing party in an arbitration in Switzerland under Swiss rules sought, unsuccessfully, to
challenge the award in both the Swiss and U.S. courts. After the first challenge in Swit-
zerland was denied, the Northern District Court of Texas rebuffed the second challenge
because the New York Convention permits annulment only by the court at the place of the
arbitration, Switzerland. 4 7 Undeterred, the losing party most recently brought yet an-
other suit, this time in the Eastern District of Texas, claiming corruption and bribery of
the arbitral tribunal and naming the arbitrators as co-defendants. 4 8 The case gained noto-
riety in the international arbitration community because the tribunal members are highly
esteemed.
Fortunately, the Texas court dismissed this most recent manifestation of the challenge.
The court noted that, although plaintiffs claimed to be seeking substantial damages (in
addition to a declaration that the award should be vacated), to afford monetary relief
would in effect require vacating the award. The court reiterated that "[u]nder the Con-
vention, [the] court [could not] vacate an arbitral award that was not made in the United
States and did not in any way involve the laws of the United States." 4 9 To second-guess
the outcome of the Swiss arbitration "would invite similar treatment by foreign courts of
arbitration awards rendered in" the United States and would "disrupt the reliability of
international arbitration established under the Convention over four decades."
50
This was a welcome result. The liberality of U.S. court pleading rules, and the absence
of fee shifting in U.S. courts, raised the prospect that such personal claims against arbitra-
tors could form a new means of collaterally attacking arbitral awards, and in the process
45. See id. at 907.
46. See id. at 913-14.
47. Gulf Petro Trading Co. v. Nigerian Nat'l Petroleum Corp., 288 F. Supp. 2d 783 (N.D. Tex. 2003),
afld, 115 Fed. Appx. 201 (5th Cir. 2004).
48. Gulf Petro Trading Co. v. Nigerian Nat'l Petroleum Corp., Civ. No. :05CV619, 2006 U.S. Dist
LEXIS 86493 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2006).
49. Id. at 7.
50. Id. at 7-8 (quoting the earlier opinion of the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas, GulfPetro Trading Co., 288 F. Supp. 2d at 793).
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have a chilling effect on international arbitration in the United States. The district court's
robust decision should make such a situation less likely. The decision is now on appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
3. Enforcement Issues
The year 2006 also produced some interesting cases involving enforcement of awards.
In Admart AG v. Birch Foundation, Inc.,51 the Third Circuit considered the extent to which
a court, in an effort to implement the arbitrator's intent, may alter an award long after the
award was made and in the face of changed circumstances. Admart involved a Swiss award
made in 1994 that contained specific provisions regarding payment for a piece of art. In
2003, a U.S. district court confirmed the award but altered some of the payment terms,
saying it was "reluctant to simply rubber-stamp the Award as written, given the passage of
time and the conduct of the parties," and wished to "bring th[e] dispute to final closure."52
On appeal, the court of appeals found that, although the district court judgment con-
firming the award was consistent with the award's substance, and although the passage of
time from the rendition of the award until the date of the district court's confirmation
order "understandably necessitated some deviation from the original terms," the order
should have "adhere[d] as closely to the text of the Award as feasible." The appeals court
accordingly took its own approach to varying the award, eliminating some provisions the
district court had imposed and restoring terms it had eliminated. In principle, however,
the Third Circuit endorsed the notion that courts can adjust awards on account of
changed circumstances.
In another case, Tekordia Tech Inc. v. Telkom SA Ltd., the Third Circuit made clear that
dismissal of an enforcement case under Article VI of the New York Convention, 53 because
of a pending annulment challenge at the arbitral seat, necessarily was without prejudice
and permitted a party to recommence the enforcement suit later if it successfully defended
the award.54 The Telcordia case was complicated by the fact that the District Court for the
District of Columbia had dismissed an earlier enforcement action, and the D.C. Circuit
had affirmed on Article VI grounds.55 The New Jersey district court treated the D.C.
Circuit Court's judgment as preclusive, and dismissed the subsequent enforcement action
it was considering with prejudice.
The Third Circuit reversed, explaining that the lower court had misconstrued the D.C.
Circuit's decision, which was not a decision on the merits, but rather a determination that
the proceeding should be adjourned pursuant to Article VI pending the outcome of the
arbitration proceeding. The D.C. court's dismissal was without prejudice, and the Third
Circuit ruled that the District Court for the District of New Jersey should not have ena-
bled the losing party in the arbitration "to be able to piggyback a dismissal without
51. Admart AG v. Birch Foundation, 457 F.3d 302 (3d Cir. 2006).
52. Admart AG. v. Birch Foundation, Civ. No. 95-410-SLR, 2004 U.S. Dist LEXIS 2428 (D. Del. 2004).
53. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958, 21
U.S.T. 2517, implemented by 9 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.
54. Telcordia Tech Inc. v. Tekom SA Ltd., 458 F.3d 172 (3rd Cir. 2006).
55. Telcordia Techs., Inc. v. Telkom SA, Ltd., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23726 (D.D.C. 2003, affd, 2004 U.S.
App. LEXIS 7081 (D.C. Cir., Apr. 9, 2004).
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prejudice into a dismissal with prejudice."5 6 This was "anathema to the 'wait-and-see'
raison d'etre of Article VI."57
4. Removal to Federal Court of New York Convention Cases
The removal provision of the legislation implementing the New York Convention was
discussed extensively in two Fifth Circuit cases, Acosta v. Master Maintenance & Construc-
tion, Inc.58 and Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Warrantech Corp.59 The court
reaffirmed its support for removal of cases that have a valid connection to the New York
Convention, but clarified that remand orders are reviewable only in a narrow set of
circumstances.
In Acosta, the Fifth Circuit expanded its already broad reading of 9 U.S.C. § 205, which
allows for the removal to federal court of actions that relate to arbitration agreements or
awards falling under the New York Convention. Plaintiffs asserted injuries from mustard
gas exposure and sued a facility owner and its insurers. The insurers removed based on
arbitration clauses in the insurance policies. The Fifth Circuit allowed removal, holding
that
[c]ommon sense dictates the conclusion that policy provisions relating to coverage of
the insured's torts are, almost by definition, related to claims that are based on the
disputed assertion of coverage of the insured's torts .... Stated as a rule, a clause
determining the forum for resolution of specific types of disputes relates to a lawsuit
that seeks the resolution of such disputes.60
In Warrantech, the appellate court considered its jurisdiction to review a district court's
remand order after a case is removed under 9 U.S.C. § 205. In the Fifth Circuit, for a
remand order to be reviewable on appeal, the district court must clearly and affirmatively
state a policy-based, non-statutory ground for remand. The district court had stated that
it was remanding because all arbitration issues had been resolved and, as a result, the
federal arbitration statutes offered "no reason from a policy standpoint" for the court to
retain jurisdiction. 6 1 The appellate court determined that this language was insufficient to
"clear the high bar of the clear-statement requirement," and therefore, the remand order
was not reviewable.
I. Investor-State Disputes
The year 2006 was another busy year for investment treaty disputes. The year included
published decisions in over thirty arbitrations. While the tribunal decisions in 2006 were
arguably less immediately controversial than certain well-known awards in the past few
years, many of the 2006 decisions will also be studied and cited in the years to come. For
example, tribunals continued to explore the meaning of most-favored nations clauses,
56. Telecordia Tecb, 458 F.3d at 179.
57. Id.
58. Acosta v. Master Maint. & Constr. Inc., 452 F.3d 373 (5th Cir. 2006).
59. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Warrentech Corp., 461 F.3d 568 (5th Cir. 2006).
60. Acosta, 452 F.3d at 379.
61. Certain Underwriters, 461 F.3d at 574.
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tended to reinforce a growing consensus among arbitrators about the content of the fair
and equitable standard, and provided guidance on damages calculations. This section re-
ports on some of the topics covered in investment treaty cases this year, starting with
jurisdiction and admissibility, turning then to merits decisions, and concluding with
damages.
A. JURISDICTION AND ADMISSIBILITY
1. Investor Standing
Although few aspects of a treaty case could be more fundamental than the definition of
an investor, the question of who qualifies as an investor under the various treaty provisions
has been a perennial topic of discussion.
a. Defining an Investor
In the past, respondents have contended that, where a corporate investor of qualifying
nationality is owned or controlled by nationals of another State, the investor should not be
considered to have qualifying nationality. But tribunals have consistently held that where
a BIT requires incorporation in the contracting State as the sole requirement for qualify-
ing as an investor, a tribunal must not examine additional conditions, such as ownership
and control. 62 The recent decisions in Saluka Investments v. Czech Republic and ADC v.
Hungary interpret the relevant BITs in the same manner.63 In both cases the respondents
contended that the qualifying nationals were mere shell companies, with the real parties in
interest being corporate parents with nationalities that did not have BIT protection. Both
tribunals rejected this argument, holding that incorporation in the qualifying country suf-
ficed to establish nationality for jurisdiction under the relevant BITs. Observing that the
investors in that case were "legal person[s] constituted or incorporated in compliance with
the law" of Cyprus as the Cyprus-Hungary BIT specified,64 the ADC tribunal pointed out
that the inquiry must stop with the incorporation and "considerations of whence comes
the company's capital and whose nationals, if not Cypriot, control it are irrelevant."65
In contrast to that textually accurate if somewhat formalistic approach, where a treaty
provides that jurisdiction may be established by ownership or control, tribunals have
tended to put aside formalism and treat the question of control pragmatically. For exam-
ple, the tribunal in International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. Mexico followed that
approach in construing NAFTA Article 1117, which permits an investor to bring a claim
on behalf of an enterprise of another Contracting Party that is a juridical person, provided
that the investor "owns or controls directly or indirectly" that enterprise.66 The claimant
62. See, e.g., Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Bolivia, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3 (Oct.
21, 2005) [hereinafter Tunari]; Tokios Tokells v. Ukraine, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/
02/18 (Apr. 29, 2004); see also Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela, C.A. v. Venezuela, Decision on jurisdic-
tion, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/5 (Sept. 27, 2001). All awards discussed in this section are available at www.
investmentclaims.com.
63. Saluka Invs. BV v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, UNCITRAL (Mar. 17, 2006) [hereinafter Saluka];
ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. Hungary, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16 (Oct. 2, 2006) [hereinafter ADC].
64. ADC, supra note 63, 357.
65. Id.
66. Int'l Thunderbird Gaming v. Mexico, UNCITRAL Award, (Jan. 26, 2006) (hereinafter Thunderbird].
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in Thunderbird partially owned three Mexican entities and did not command a majority of
their shares. The tribunal nevertheless rejected Mexico's challenge,67 holding that effec-
tive or de facto control was sufficient, provided it was established beyond any reasonable
doubt.68 The tribunal considered that even a minority owner may have the power to
effectively decide and implement the key decisions of the business activity of the enter-
prise, or it may achieve de facto control by "the existence of one or more factors such as
technology, access to supplies, access to markets, access to capital, know how, and authori-
tative reputation." 69 The Thunderbird tribunal thus espoused a flexible, fact dependent
test for establishing control.
b. Change of Ownership
A number of cases dating back at least to FEDAX N.V. v. Venezuela70 and running
through Loewen Group v. United States71 have involved circumstances where ownership of
the investor or the investment has changed before potential BIT claims could be asserted
or conclusively resolved.
The tribunal in L.E.S.L S.p.A. et ASTALDI S.p.A. v. People's Democratic Republic of Alge-
ria held that where a company that was a party to a government contract validly merged
into another company of the same nationality, the surviving company had standing to
assert claims and commence arbitration arising out of the contract.72 Tribunals reached
similar results in three cases involving claimants who had sold their remaining assets in the
host State after having instituted arbitration proceedings. In El Paso Energy International
Co. v. Argentina, National Grid PLC v. Argentina, and EnCana Corp. v. Ecuador, the tribu-
nals rejected the respondents' objections and held that there was "no rule of continuous
ownership of the investment." 73 The tribunal in EnCana observed that the cause of action
was complete at the date of the treaty breach causing loss or damage. 74 According to the
El Paso decision, the purpose of BITs would be defeated if continuous ownership were
required, because BITs addressed issues of "confiscation, expropriation and nationalization
of foreign investments. Once the taking has occurred, there is nothing left except the




70. Fedax N.V. v. Venezuela, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3 (July 11,
1997).
71. The Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Decision of the Arbitral Tribunal on Hearing of Respon-
dent's Objection to the Competence and Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3 (Jan. 5, 2001).
72. L.E.S.I. S.p.A v. Algeria, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/3 July 12, 2006) [herein-
after L.E.S.I.].
73. El Paso Energy Int'l Co. Ltd. v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/I 5,
135 (Apr. 27, 2006) [hereinafter El Paso]; National Grid PLC v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, UNCI-
TRAL, 1 118 (June 20, 2006) [hereinafter National Grid]; see, e.g., Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v.
Slovak Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4, 1 31 (May 24, 1999); The Vivendi II
tribunal also observed, "it is generally recognized that the determination of whether a party has standing in an
international judicial forum, for purposes of jurisdiction to institute proceedings, is made by reference to the
date on which such proceedings are deemed to have been instituted." See Compaifa de Aguas del Aconquija,
S.A. v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, 1 60-61 (Nov. 14, 2005).
74. EnCana Corporation v. Ecuador, Award, UNCITRAL, T 131 (Feb. 3, 2006) [hereinafter EnCana].
75. El Paso, svpra note 73 1 135.
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exist, i.e. the right to demand compensation for the injury suffered at the hands of the
State remains," except if it "can be shown that [the claim] was sold with the investment." 76
2. Qualifying Investment
a. Claims Arising out of Investments
Whether a putative investor owns an investment subject to BIT protection is another
issue that may arise. The precise definition of an investment in any given circumstance
depends on the precise wording of the relevant treaty or law. But the cases have offered
some general guidance with respect to treaty interpretation. For example, in Jan de Nul
N. V. Dredging International N. V. v. Egypt,77 the tribunal followed a test that had previously
been established in Salini v. Morocco, according to which the following criteria are indica-
tive of an investment for purposes of the ICSID Convention: (i) a contribution; (ii) a
certain duration over which the project is implemented; (iii) a sharing of operational risks;
and (iv) a contribution to the host State's development.78 The tribunals in LESI v. Algeria
and Saluka Investments v. Czech Republic, however, held that it was unnecessary to establish
the fourth element, because it would be difficult to determine whether an investment
contributed to the economic development of the host State. 79 Hence the Saluka tribunal
rejected the Czech Republic's argument that "a short-term holding of shares [in a bank]
with a view to making a large profit from the sale of major assets" controlled by that bank
could not qualify as an investment.8 0
The Argentina cases provided a lens through which to view the requirement in Article
25(1) of the Washington Convention that a dispute arises "directly out of an investment."
In those cases, Argentina has argued that its adoption of general economic measures was
not specifically directed against an investor and hence did not satisfy the nexus the Wash-
ington Convention requires. As in past years, Argentina's argument was rejected in 2006
by all arbitration tribunals that considered it, on the grounds that Article 2 5(1) required "a
connection of a sufficient degree of directness between a dispute submitted to ICSID and a
claimant's investment."8' As a result, "the adverb 'directly' is not related to the link be-
tween the measure and the investment but to that between the dispute and the invest-
ment,"8 2 and the term "specific" cannot be considered "as a synonym of'directly.' 8 3 The
UNCITRAL tribunal in National Grid v. Argentina came to a similar conclusion when
76. Id.
77. Jan de Nul N.V. v. Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/13 (June 16, 2006)
[hereinafter Jan de Null.
78. Salini Construttori S.p.A. v. Morocco, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4 (July 23,
2001).
79. L.E.S.I., supra note 72, 1 72, 73; Saluka, supra note 63, 210.
80. Saluka, supra note 63, 209.
81. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/17, 29 (May 16, 2006) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter Suez ICSID 1]; Suez, Sociedad
General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19
(Aug. 3, 2006) [hereinafter Suez ICSID I]; AWG Group Ltd. v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, UNCI-
TRAL , T 29 (Aug. 3, 2006) [hereinafter Suez UNCITRAL].
82. El Paso, supra note 73, T1 97; see also Metalpar S.A. y Buen Aire, SA. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/5, 919 90-98 (Apr. 27, 2006) [hereinafter Metalpar] (holding that, for a dispute to arise directly out of
an investment, there must exist an immediate cause and effect relation between the acts of the host State and
the effects of such acts on the protected investments).
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examining Article 8 of the Argentina-U.K. BIT that required the existence of a "dispute
with regard to an investment." The tribunal concluded that there "has to be a connection
between the [m]easures and the investment," but that "connection does not need to be
exclusive."84
b. Investment Made in Conformity with the Law
A developing area of BIT jurisprudence concerns the obligation found in many BITs
that an investment must be made in conformity with the law or words to similar effect.
Recent decisions suggest that tribunals may take a dualistic approach to this requirement;
they will not dismiss claims because investors have failed in some minor or technical re-
spect to comply with local law, but will dismiss claims where investors have engaged in
some kind of fraudulent or criminal activity with respect to the investment.
The tribunal in Metalpar S.A. y Buen Aire S.A. v. Argentina held that the failure of one
of the claimants to register its investment in Argentina in accordance with Argentine legal
requirements before filing its claim did not affect its capacity as an investor under the
Argentina-Chile BIT.85 Similarly, in L.E.S.I. v. Algeria, the tribunal rejected Algeria's
objection that the contract for the construction of a dam system did not formally meet the
requirements for an investment under Algerian law. The tribunal explained that the terms
of an international treaty could not be interpreted in view of the domestic legislation of
one of the parties. 86
In contrast, in Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L. v. El Salvador, an ICSID tribunal held that an
investment procured by fraud was not "in conformity with the law."8 7 The tribunal up-
held El Salvador's jurisdictional objection, finding that Inceysa had presented false and
misleading information in bidding for a concession contract in violation of law and the
principle of good faith.88 The tribunal observed that international public policy required
that El Salvador's consent to ICSID jurisdiction under the BIT should not extend to in-
vestments that were not made in accordance with law, and ordered the claimants to bear
the entire cost of the arbitration.8 9 Similarly, in World Duty Free Company Ltd. v. Kenya, an
ICSID tribunal constituted under an investment agreement between the parties dismissed
the claim on the grounds that Kenya's former president had solicited and obtained a $2
million dollar bribe from claimant to procure the investment.90 The tribunal concluded-
that the claimant was not legally entitled to maintain any of its pleaded claims in the
proceedings as a matter of ordre public international and public policy under English and
Kenyan laws, which applied under the investment agreement.91
83. Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, 91 71 (Feb. 22, 2006); see also Total, S.A. v.
Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01, 65 (Aug. 25, 2006).
84. National Grid, svpra note 73, 9 139.
85. Metalpar, supra note 82, 1 72-85.
86. L.E.S.I., supra note 72, 91 83(iii).
87. Inceysa Vallisoletana S.L. v. El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26 (Aug. 2, 2006).
88. Id. 91101-27.
89. Id. 252.
90. World Duty Free Co. Ltd. v. Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7 (Oct. 4, 2006) [hereinafter World
Duty Free].
91. Id. 9 188.
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3. Dispute with a Contracting State
In the Jan de Nul v. Egypt and L.E.S.I. v. Algeria arbitrations, respondents argued that
there was no "dispute with a Contracting Party"-and hence the tribunals lacked jurisdic-
tion-because the entity with which the claimants had contracted had independent legal
personality and its acts could not be attributed to the State. The tribunals in both cases
observed that it was "not for the [t]ribunal at the jurisdictional stage to examine whether
the case is in effect brought against the State and involves the latter's responsibility."92
Instead, it was "sufficient that the case was brought against the State. '93 But "[a]n excep-
tion is made in the event that if it is manifest that the entity involved has no link whatso-
ever with the State."94 In both cases, the tribunals concluded that, on the basis of the
material submitted by the claimants, the responsibility of the host State could not be
excluded. 95
4. Umbrella Clauses
The jurisprudence is split on whether umbrella clauses transform all breaches of con-
tract into treaty breaches or whether umbrella clauses merely protect contract breaches
that amount to a violation of the other standards of protection under the BIT. Advocates
of a narrow reading of umbrella clauses now can rely on two additional decisions.
The tribunals in El Paso v. Argentina and B.P. v. Argentina cases examined the relatively
broadly worded umbrella clause in the Argentina-United States BIT according to which
"[e]ach Party shall observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to invest-
ments." 96 Both tribunals appear to have been troubled by recent decisions in SGS v. Phil-
ippines, Eureko v. Poland, and Noble Ventures v. Romania, holding that, by force of the
umbrella clause, the breach of a contract was assimilated to a breach of the BIT.97 They
consequently concluded that umbrella clauses "cannot entertain purely contractual claims,
which do not amount to a violation of the standards of protection of the BIT."9 Accord-
ing to both tribunals, "an umbrella clause cannot transform any contract claims into a
treaty claim, as this would necessarily imply that any commitments of the State in respect
to investments, even the most minor ones, would be transformed into treaty claims." 99 If
that were permitted, "the division between the national legal order and the international
legal order is completely blurred." 100
92. Jan de Nul, supra note 77, 1 85; L.E.S.I. supra note 72, % 78.
93. L.E.S.I., svpra note 72, 1 78.
94. Jan de Nul, stpra note 77 1 85, L.E.S.I., supra note 72, $ 78.
95. Id.
96. According to the El Paso tribunal, "[tlhe broadest [umbrella] clauses read like that contained in the
relevant clause of Article H(2)(c) in the U.S.-Argentina BIT." El Paso, supra note 73, 1 70; Pan Am. Energy
LLC v. Argentina, Decision on Preliminary Objections, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/13, 99 (July 27, 2006)
[hereinafter Pan Ain].
97. SGS v. Philippines, Decision on Objections toJurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6 (Jan. 29, 2004);
Eureko B.V. v. Poland, Partial Award, Ad Hoc Arbitral Tribunal (Aug. 19, 2005); Noble Ventures, Inc. v.
Romania, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/l1 (Oct. 12, 2005).
98. El Paso, supra, note 73, 85; Pan Am, supra, note 96, 1 115.
99. El Paso, supra, note 73, 9 82; Pan Am, supra, note 96, 110.
100. El Paso, supra, note 73, 9 77.
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The El Paso and BP cases instead distinguished "the State as a merchant from the State
as a sovereign."'01 They assumed that investors require protection only from the State
acting as a sovereign, not from the State acting as a merchant. 0 2 They sought textual
support for their view in Article VJ(l) of the BIT, which confers arbitral jurisdiction to
decide disputes regarding "an investment agreement between [a] Party and [a] national or
company." In the tribunals' view, that provision "includes among the investment disputes
under the Treaty all disputes resulting from a violation of a commitment given by the State
as a sovereign State."103 The tribunals reached that conclusion although Article VII(l) of
the BIT does not define investment agreements as solely referring to agreements con-
cluded by the State as a sovereign, whatever meaning one ascribes to that term.
That conclusion differs from the holding of some earlier tribunals, and from dicta in
LESI v. Algeria, where the tribunal stated that umbrella clauses "have the effect of trans-
forming the violations of contractual obligations of the State [into] violations of that
clause of the BIT."104 The last word has plainly not been spoken on this topic.
5. Most-Favored-Nation Clauses
Another much-discussed issue that has divided tribunals is whether the most-favored-
nation clause (MFN clause) in various BITs can be used to import elements of a more
favorable dispute settlement mechanism contained in a second BIT that the respondent
State concluded with a third State. In 2006, the controversy intensified.
In Suez v. Argentina,105 AWG v. Argentina, 10 6 and National Grid v. Argentina,1° 7 tribu-
nals permitted investors to use MFN clauses to avoid BIT provisions requiring resort to
local courts before commencing arbitration. The MFN clause in the Argentina-Spain
BIT at issue in Suez expressly provided that it applied to "all matters subject to this Agree-
ment."108 The tribunals concluded that dispute settlement was "certainly a 'matter' gov-
erned by the Argentina-Spain BIT" and was, in effect, "as important as other matters
governed by the BIT" and "an integral part of the investment protection regime" Argen-
tina and Spain agreed upon. 10 9 The tribunals cited Maffezini v. Spain and other cases. 10
While the MFN clause in the Argentina-U.K. BIT at issue in National Grid and A WG did
not specifically provide that it applied "to all matters governed by this Agreement," the
tribunals in those cases observed that "dispute resolution is not included among the excep-
tions to the application of the clause." Applying the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio
101. Id. TT 79, 81; Pan Am, snpra note 96, 11 108-09.
102. El Paso, supra note 73, 91 79-80; Pan Am, supra note 96, 108.
103. El Paso, supra note 73, 81 (emphasis added); Pan Am, supra note 96, 109.
104. L.E.S.I., supra note 72, T 84.
105. Suez v. Argentina refers to the Suez ICSID I, Suez ICSID U, and Suez UNCITRAL arbitrations.
106. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A., Vivendi Universal, S.A v. The Argentine Repub-
lic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 and AWG Group Ltd. v. The Argentine Republic.
107. See National Grid, supra note 73.
108. Argentina-Spain Bilateral Treaty art. IV; Suez ICSID I, supra note 81, T 53; Suez UNCITRAL, supra
note 81, T 53.
109. Suez UNCITRAL, supra note 81, 91 55, 59.
110. Suez ICSID I, supra note 81, 161; Suez UNCITRAL, supra note 81, 1 53; Siemens A.G. v. Argentina,
Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8 T 102 (Aug. 2, 2004); MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v. Chile,
Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7 (May 25, 2004) [hereinafter MTD].
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alteri us, the tribunals concluded that, by not being expressly excluded from the application
of the clause, dispute resolution was among the matters covered by the clause."'
These tribunals sought to distinguish Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Bulgaria, in which an
ICSID tribunal concluded it had no jurisdiction over claims arising out of the Bulgaria-
Cyprus BIT. That BIT did not provide for ICSID jurisdiction, but did contain an MFN
clause that the investor said permitted it to borrow ICSID dispute settlement clauses from
other treaties ratified by the host State. 1 2 The more recent tribunals observed that the
claimant in Plama attempted to replace the Bulgaria-Cyprus BIT dispute settlement
mechanism "in toto," and considered that this "radical effect" could be distinguished from
the "much more limited one caused here, which merely consists in waiving a preliminary
step" in accessing ICSID.' 13 If dispute settlement options are indeed part of the treatment
guaranteed to investors by BITs generally and MFN clauses specifically, it is not entirely
clear why MFN clauses should provide qualifying investors with equal treatment for pre-
liminary matters only, nor why the MEN clauses should permit borrowing another
treaty's dispute settlement provisions in part but not in their entirety as a complete and
integrated package. Yet that is one possible implication of these recent cases.
At the same time, the tribunal in Telenor Mobile Communications A.S. v. Hungary, may
have gone even further than Plama in restricting use of an MFN clause. The tribunal
cited Plama when it refused to use the Norway-Hungary BIT's MFN clause to assert
jurisdiction over claims other than expropriation." 14 The Telenor tribunal read the provi-
sion "investments shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to
investments made by investors of any third State" to refer only to substantive rights, and
not to procedural rights. 1 5 While the tribunal worried about "treaty-shopping by the
investor," that is arguably the very purpose of MFN clauses in that they ensure investors
or investments the best treatment the host State has made available to any investor or
investment. The tribunal also reviewed the BITs signed by Norway and Hungary and
concluded that the parties to the Norway-Hungary BIT had made "a deliberate choice to
limit arbitration" to claims of expropriation and "have eschewed the wide form of dispute
resolution clause adopted in many of their other BITs."" 6 In the tribunal's view, "to
invoke the MEN clause to embrace the method of dispute resolution is to subvert the
intention of the parties to the basic treaty."" 7
These recent decisions confirm that questions about the interpretation of MFN clauses
to include dispute settlement provisions are still far from being settled and are likely to
remain an issue that will be fiercely litigated by parties in BIT disputes.
111. Suez UNCITRAL, supra note 81, T 58; National Grid, supra note 73, 1 82 (citing 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUB. INT'L LAW 411, 415 (R. Bernhardt ed.,1985) ("By its nature, the unconditional clause, unless otherwise
agreed, attracts all favors extended on whatever grounds by the granting State to the third State")). See also
Gas Natural SDG, S.A.v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/10 (June 17, 2005).
112. Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Bulgaria, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24 (Feb. 8,
2005).
113. Suez ICSID I, supra note 81, 63; Suez UNCITRAL, supra note 81, T 65.
114. Telenor Mobile Communic'n A.S. v. Hungary, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/I 5
(Sept. 13, 2005).
115. Id. T 92.
116. Id. T 97.
117. Id. T 95.
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6. Timeliness of Claims
The year 2006 also featured a number of decisions about whether claims were too early
or too late. In Jan de Nul v. Egypt the tribunal considered a BIT that applied to invest-
ments made before its entry into force, but provided that it was not "applicable to disputes
having arisen prior to its entry into force."l '1 As the claimants had previously prosecuted
a case through the Egyptian courts concerning the same project to widen the Suez Canal,
the parties disagreed on whether the dispute before the ICSID Tribunal had arisen before
or after May 23, 2002, the BIT's effective date. The Jan de Nul tribunal held that the
2002 BIT sought to exclude earlier disputes that "could be deemed 'treaty disputes' under
treaty standards." The dispute before the Egyptian courts was not such a treaty dispute, as
it related to questions of contract interpretation and Egyptian law, which differed from
the treaty-based dispute before the ICSID tribunal.')19 The fact that the bulk of the claims
concerned BIT violations in connection with the very facts that founded the claim before
the Egyptian court did "not change the situation." What mattered was that "the domestic
dispute antedated the international dispute and ultimately led towards it."20
In Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. v. United States, the tribunal considered a
jurisdictional objection under Articles 1116(2) and 1117(2) of NAFTA, which provide that
"an investor may not make a claim if more than three years have elapsed from the date on
which the investor first acquired, or should have first acquired, knowledge of the alleged
breach and knowledge that the investor has incurred loss or damage." The claimants in
that case sought redress for the Master Settlement Agreement (which settled the litigation
cases brought by more than forty U.S. state attorneys against U.S. tobacco producers) and
the escrow laws subsequently adopted, as well as related measures and enforcement
actions. 12 1
In interpreting the term "should have first acquired knowledge," the tribunal invoked
the concept of constructive knowledge and observed that constructive knowledge "is im-
puted to a person if by exercise of reasonable care or diligence, the person would have
known that fact." 122 The tribunal emphasized that investors who intend to make an in-
vestment in a foreign jurisdiction "ought to have made reasonable inquiries about signifi-
cant legal requirements potentially impacting their activities." 23 Investment treaties are
not "substitutes for prudence and diligent inquiry in international investors' conduct of
their affairs."124 The tribunal concluded that the claimants should have known prior to
the relevant date (March 12, 2001) of the Master Settlement Agreement, the escrow stat-
ute and related measures and enforcement actions taken prior to that date, and of loss and
damages they incurred as a result in relation to off-reservation sales. As a result, the
claims with respect to those matters were barred under Articles 1116(2) and 1117(2) of
118. Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union and Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 12, 2002.
119. Jan de Nul, supra note 77, 1 117.
120. Id.; cf Lucchetti, S.A. v. Peru, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/4, 1 50 (Feb. 7, 2005) (finding no new
dispute when "the facts or considerations that gave rise to the earlier dispute continued to be central to the
later dispute").
121. Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. United States, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction,
NAFTA/UNCITRAL Ouly 20, 2006).
122. Id. 59.
123. Id. 91 66.
124. Id. T 67.
SUMMER 2007
272 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
NAFTA, except for the claims that related to sales made on Native American
reservations.12
5
'While in the foregoing cases the respondents contended that the claims were too late,
in Western NIS Enterprise Fund v. Ukraine, the respondent claimed they were too early
because the investor had not given Ukraine proper notice of the claim.' 26 The tribunal
observed that "proper notice is an important element of the State's consent to arbitration,
as it allows the State, acting through its competent organs, to examine and possibly resolve
the dispute by negotiations." But the tribunal clarified that failure to give proper notice
"in and of itself [did not] affect the [t]ribunal's jurisdiction." The tribunal thus granted
the claimant "an opportunity to remedy the deficient notice" by furnishing the tribunal
with evidence that it had given proper notice to Ukraine.127 The tribunal then decided to
strictly observe the waiting period, holding that the court would suspend proceedings for
six months from the date of any proper notice furnished to the tribunal "unless both sides
agree to reactivate the proceedings earlier." 128
7. Taxation Measures
Several BITs exclude taxation measures from the scope of the BIT, but they often pro-
vide for exceptions when the tax measures amount to violations of certain BIT protec-
tions. The Canada-Ecuador BIT, for instance, excludes any taxation measures from the
scope of the BIT, except when such a taxation measure amounts to an expropriation of an
investment under Article VIII of that BIT.129 In the EnCana v. Ecuador arbitration, the
tribunal agreed with Ecuador that EnCana's claims concerning Value Added Tax (VAT)
refunds were "inextricably associated with a 'taxation measure.'"130 Under the tribunal's
analysis, it was irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes whether a taxation measure was "ar-
guably in breach of commonly accepted substantive standards for such measures," had
been applied in an idiosyncratic or discriminatory manner, or was "based on a wrong
factual premis[e]."1 31 The tribunal thus decided it had no jurisdiction over EnCana's VAT
refund claim.
The Argentina-U.S. BIT also excludes tax measures from the scope of the BIT, but
accords broader exceptions than the Canada-Ecuador BIT. The treaty carves out from its
exclusion not only expropriations but also "transfers pursuant to Article V" and "the ob-
servance and enforcement of terms of an investment agreement or authorization." In the
BP v. Argentina cases, the claimants did not dispute that Argentina's export withholdings
qualified as tax measures pursuant to the Argentina-U.S. BIT. But they argued that their
claims were claims of expropriation and breaches of investment agreements and were thus
under the tribunal's jurisdiction. The BP tribunal agreed that the claimants had demon-
strated "primafacie that the imposition of export withholdings ... could possibly amount
125. Id. 1 83.
126. Western NIS Enter. Fund v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/2 (Mar. 16, 2006).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Ecuador for
the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments art. 7, Can.-Ecuador, Apr. 29, 1996.
130. EnCana, supra note 74, 11 133, 135.
131. Id. TT9 146-47.
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to the expropriation of specific legal and contractual rights"132 and that the claimants'
"[h]ydrocarbon [c]oncession and [c]ontracts could be 'investment agreements' within the
meaning ... of the BIT."' 3- The tribunal therefore concluded that it had jurisdiction over
Argentina's export withholdings, but only insofar as those withholdings were linked to
expropriation, transfers, and the observance and enforcement of investment agreements
and authorizations.1
34
8. Exception to Jurisdiction under Article 1901 (3) of NAFTA.
Article 1901(3) of NAFFA requires that, with the exception of NAFTA's entry-into-
force provision, "no provision of any other Chapter in this Agreement shall be construed
as imposing obligations on a Party with respect to the Party's antidumping law or counter-
vailing duty law." In the consolidated cases of Canfor Corp. v. United States, and Terminal
Forest Products Ltd. v. United States, the claimants submitted claims with respect to U.S.
antidumping and countervailing duty law. 135 The tribunal decided that, by virtue of Arti-
cle 1901(3), it had no jurisdiction to decide the claims to the extent that they concerned
U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty law. As a result, the tribunal also lacked juris-
diction over the claims in so far as they concerned the conduct of commerce, the U.S.
International Trade Commission, and other government entities and officials before, dur-
ing, and after the preliminary and final determinations in relation to such antidumping
and countervailing duty law. 136 But the tribunal held that the so-called Byrd Amendment
was not antidumping or countervailing duty law within the meaning of that term under
Article 1901(3), and therefore, the tribunal had jurisdiction to decide the claims to the
extent that they concerned the Byrd Amendment. 3 7
B. PROCEDURE
1. Amicus Curiae and Nonparty Participation
In Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A v. Argentina, an Argentine NGO and
several individual petitioners sought to attend the hearings, submit amicus curiae briefs,
and have access to the documents produced in the case.' 13 In line with a prior decision by the
tribunal in Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Republic of Bolivia,13 9 the Suez tribunal observed that,
pursuant to then ICSID Arbitration Rule 32(2), only the parties, their agents, counsel and
132. BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Argentina, Decision on Preliminary Objections, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/8, J
136 (July 27, 2006) [hereinafter BP Am. Prod.].
133. Md. 1 138.
134. Id. 1 139.
135. Cantor Corp. v. United States, Decision on Preliminary Question, NAFTA/UNCITRAL (June 6,
2006).
136. Id. 9] 347-50.
137. Id. 274-278, 347-50. The Byrd Amendment is codified in 19 U.S.C. § 1675 and was in the process
of being repealed at the time the decision was rendered. It provided that any duties assessed pursuant to a
countervailing or antidumping duty order shall be distributed on an annual basis to the affected domestic
producers. See id. 9] 345.
138. Suez Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. v. Argentina, Order in Response to a Petition for
Participation as Amnicus Curaie, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, '129 (Mar. 17, 2006) [hereinafter Suez Amicus
Petition].
139. Tunari, supra note 62, 9 15-18.
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advocates, witnesses and experts, and the tribunal's officers could participate at the hear-
ings, unless the parties agreed otherwise. 140 The tribunal nevertheless held that ICSID tribu-
nals had the power to admit amicus curiae submissions, but noted that the standards for
doing so had not been met in the present case. It therefore dismissed the petition without
prejudice, but granted the petitioners the opportunity "to apply for leave to make amicus curiae
submission if and when the Petitioners provide the [t]ribunal with convincing information
and reasons that they qualify as amicus curiae."141 The tribunal said that it would even
reconsider the amici's request for access to documents.1 2 These standards may change as
a result of recent amendments to the ICSID Rules, which are described below in Section
IV.
2. Consolidation of Proceedings
Absent a specific agreement to the contrary, the consolidation of two or more ICSID
proceedings requires the consent of all the parties involved. In the BP v. Argentina cases,
all parties consented to consolidate two separately filed arbitration proceedings. On May
23, 2003, Pan American Energy LLC and BP Argentina Exploration Company, two Dela-
ware companies, initiated arbitration proceedings against the Republic of Argentina, alleg-
ing that Argentina's economic emergency measures violated the protections for claimants'
investments under the U.S.-Argentina BIT.143 Seven months later, on December 17,
2003, BP America Production Company, a Delaware company that owns and controls BP
Argentina Exploration Company, and three Argentine subsidiaries of Pan American En-
ergy LLC (Pan American Sur SRL, Pan American Fueguina SRL, and Pan American
Continental SRL) also initiated ICSID proceedings alleging breaches of the U.S.-Argen-
tina BIT. 44 In March 2004, Argentina and the claimants in both proceedings agreed that
the cases should be consolidated and heard by the same tribunal. 45 As a result, the tribu-
nal constituted in the first filed arbitration heard the consolidated cases and rendered a
single decision on jurisdiction on July 27, 2006.
On April 17, 2003, ICSID received several requests regarding water concessions in Ar-
gentina: a case instituted by Aguas Provinciales de Santa Fe, S.A., Suez Sociedad General de
Aguas Barcelona SA. and Interagua Servicios Integrales del Agua, S.A.; 146 a second case insti-
tuted by Aguas Cordobesas, S.A., Suez and Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A.; 147
and a third case instituted by Aguas Argentinas, S-A., Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de
Barcelona, S-A., Vivendi Universal, S.A. and AWG. 4s, The parties to those cases agreed that
140. Suez Amicus Petition, supra note 138, 9 6-7.
141. Id. 1 38.
142. Id.
143. See Pan Am, supra note 96.
144. See BP Am. Prod., supra note 132.
145. Id. 91 4.
146. Suez ICSID I, supra note 81.
147. Suez and Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/18 (May 16, 2006).
148. Suez UJNCITRAL, supra note 81. Pursuant to the terms of Article 8(3) of the Argentina-UK BIT,
AWG was required to submit its dispute to arbitration under the ad hoc UNCITRAL Rules. Argentina did
not accept AWG's offer to extend ICSID jurisdiction to the claims of AWG, but agreed to allow the case to
be administered by ICSID. On April 14, 2006, the tribunal discontinued the proceedings with respect to
Aguas Argentinas, S.A.
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one single tribunal would hear all cases, but they did not agree to formally consolidate
them. The parties also agreed on a staggered schedule of written and oral submissions.149
The tribunal rendered decisions on jurisdiction in the first and the third case with largely
identical holdings on May 16, 2006, and on August 3, 2006. The second case is currently
suspended.
3. Provisional Measures
In conformity with existing jurisprudence, the ICSID tribunal in Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. United
Republic of Tanzania held that provisional measures under Article 47 of the ICSID Rules
may be used not only to protect a party's substantive rights, but also to safeguard a party's
procedural rights with respect to the production of evidence. Biwater Gauff had re-
quested such provisional measures as, among others, (1) to preserve certain items of evi-
dence and (2) to obtain from Tanzania a compilation of an inventory of documentsS(0
The tribunal granted the request.151 The tribunal also ordered the parties to keep certain
documents confidential. But "the tribunal refused to ban public discussion of the pro-
ceedings by the parties as long as such discussion was not used as an instrument to
antagonise the parties, exacerbate their differences, unduly pressure one of them, or
render the resolution of the dispute potentially more difficult." 5 2
4. Stay of Enforcement
In the latest of a series of stay-of-enforcement decisions, the ad hoc Annulment Com-
mittee in CMS v. Argentina granted a stay of enforcement without security, because Ar-
gentina's Attorney General sought to enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by the
tribunal's award in the event that annulment was not granted.1s 3 The tribunal observed
that, "[als a general matter a respondent State seeking annulment should be entitled to a
stay provided it gives reasonable assurances that the award, if not annulled, will be com-
plied with."l54 The tribunal then examined whether such assurance should take the form
of a bank guarantee. Five previous ad hoc committees stayed enforcement on condition of
a guaranteelss whereas three previous ad hoc committees declined to make the stay con-
149. Id.




153. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, Decision on the Argentine Republic's Request for a Contin-
ued Stay of Enforcement of the Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 (Sept. 1, 2006) [hereinafter CMS Stay of
Enforcement].
154. Id. 38.
155. Amco Asia Corp. v. Indonesia, Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee Setting Aside the Award Rendered
on the Merits in the Arbitration Between Amco Asia Corp. and Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, 25
ILM 1439 (May 16, 1986); Amco Asia Corp. v. Indonesia, Interim Order No. I Concerning the Stay of
Enforcement of the Award of March 2, 1991, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/I, 9 ICSID Rep. 59 (2006); Wena
Hotels Ltd. v. Egypt, Decision on Application for Annulment, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, 41 ILM 933 (Feb.
5, 2002); CDC Group plc v. Seychelles, Decision of the ad hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment
of the Republic of the Seychelles, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/14 (June 29, 2005); Repsol YPF Ecuador, S.A.v.
Empresa Estatal Petroleos del Ecuador (Petroecuador), Procedural Order No. 1, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/
10 (Dec. 22, 2005).
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ditional on a guarantee.15 6 The tribunal concluded that, in the present case, no bank guar-
antee was required, despite reports in the Argentine press that, in the event of a negative
annulment decision, the constitutionality of ICSID awards would be examined before the
Argentine Supreme Court or that Argentina would bring a case before the International
Court of Justice under the Argentina-U.S. BIT.
But Argentina's Attorney General, Dr. Oswaldo Cesar Guglielmino, had provided "an
undertaking to CMS ... that, in accordance with its obligations under the ICSID Con-
vention, it would recognize the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal in this proceeding
as binding and would enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its
territories, in the event that annulment was not granted." 157 Relying on the jurisprudence
of the World Court in the German Interests in Upper Silesia case, and more recently, in the
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay case, the CMS tribunal held that, under international law,
the attorney general, as its agent, had the authority to bind Argentina. Because of that
binding commitment, CMS would not be prejudiced by the continued stay of enforce-
ment even without security such as a bank guarantee. 158
In the annulment proceedings of Repsol YPF Ecuador, S.A. v. Empresa Estatal Petrdleos del
Ecuador (Petroecuador), the ad hoc committee granted a stay of enforcement subject to a
bank guarantee "collectable in its entirety by Repsol in the event that Petroecuador's ap-
plication was completely rejected." 159 When Petroecuador failed to deliver the guarantee
within the time period established, the committee terminated the stay of enforcement of
the arbitral award. 160
C. DECISIONS ON THE MERITS
The year 2006 also witnessed the publication of merits awards in seven arbitrations that
will generate considerable discussion amongst practitioners and academics. They include
LG&E v. Argentina,16 1 ADC v. Hungary, Azurix Corp. v. Argentina,162 Saluka Investments v.
Czech Republic, EnCana v. Ecuador, Salini v. Jordan,16 3 and International Thunderbird Gam-
ing v. Mexico.
156. Maritime Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Guinea, Ad hoc Committee Decision of (Dec. 22, 1989),
ICSID Case No. ARB/84/4, 5 ICSID Rev. FILJ 95 (1990); Mitchell v. Congo, Decision on the Stay of
Enforcement of the Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7 (Nov. 30, 2004); MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v. Chile,
Decision on the Respondent's Request for a Continued Stay of Execution, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7 fJune
1, 2005) [hereinafter MTD Continued Stay).
157. CIMS Stay of Enforcement, supra note 153, 1 28.
158. Id. 50.
159. Repsol YPF Ecuador, S.A. v. Empresa Estatal Petr6leos del Ecuador (Petroecuador), Procedural Order
No. I Concerning the Stay of Enforcement of the Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/10 (December 22, 2005).
160. Id.
161. LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina, Decision on Liability, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1 (Oct. 3, 2006)
[hereinafter LG&EI.
162. Azurix Corp. v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/O1/12 (July 14, 2006) [hereinafter Azurix].
163. See Salini Construtorri S.p.A. v. Jordan, Final Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, (Jan. 31, 2006),
available at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Salini-Jordan-Final-Award.pdf [hereinafter Salini]
(providing both the decision of the tribunal and a dissent entitled, Declaration of Sir Ian Sinclair).
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1. Fair and Equitable Treatment
Several tribunals during 2006 set forth interpretations of the fair and equitable treat-
ment standard. As noted by the Saluka tribunal with respect to fair and equitable treat-
ment, impairment, and nondiscrimination, "vague as they may be, [they] are susceptible of
specification through judicial practice and do in fact have sufficient legal content to allow
the case to be decided on the basis of law. Over the last few years, a number of awards
have dealt with such standards yielding a fair amount of practice that sheds light on their
legal meaning." 164
a. Legitimate Expectations
Some tribunals have looked to legitimate expectations as a fundamental element of deci-
sions on breaches of fair and equitable treatment. As noted by the LG&E tribunal, "[iun
addition to the State's obligation to provide a stable legal and business environment, the
fair and equitable treatment analysis involves consideration of the investor's expectations
when making its investment in reliance on the protections to be granted by the host
State."165
In the Thunderbird arbitration, the claimant argued that if an investor or investment
reasonably relies on the representations of government officials and suffers damages be-
cause of such reliance, the responsibility of the State is engaged under international law.
Although the tribunal confirmed the existence of the concept of legitimate expectations, it
did not agree with the investor that the events in question had generated such an
expectation. 166
After taking into account the ordinary meaning, context, object, and purpose of the
treaty, the Saluka tribunal concluded that "[t]he standard of 'fair and equitable treatment'
[i]s therefore closely tied to the notion of legitimate expectations which is the dominant
element of the standard."167 In line with statements of the tribunal in S.D. Myers v. Ca-
nada, the Saluka tribunal underscored that the determination of a breach of the fair and
equitable treatment obligation requires a balanced approach to the interests of the disput-
ing parties by "a weighing of the Claimant's legitimate and reasonable expectations on the
one hand and the Respondent's legitimate regulatory interests on the other." 65 It also
emphasized the need for the "stability of the legal and business framework," 169 and that a
failure to provide such a "predictable and transparent" investment framework could con-
stitute a breach of such expectations. 170
In its award, the LG&E tribunal usefully summarized the features of the legitimate ex-
pectation element of fair and equitable treatment as follows:
164. Saluka, svpra note 63, 284.
165. LG&E, nipra note 161, 127.
166. Thunderbird, svpra note 66, J 148.
167. Saluka, supra note 63, $ 302-03.
168. Id. T 306.
169. Saluka, supra note 57, 303 (citing Occidental, Exploration and Production Company v. Ecuador, Final
Award, LCIA Case No. UN3467, 1J 80-92 (2004) [hereinafter Occidental].
170. Saluka, mpra note 63, 348. Note that the Tribunal did not find a breach of legitimate expectations in
that case. See id. $ 348-60, 500.
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It can be said that the investor's fair expectations have the following characteristics: 1)
they are based on the conditions offered by the host State at the time of the invest-
ment; 2) they may not be established unilaterally by one of the parties; 3) they must
exist and be enforceable by law; and 4) in the event of infringement by the host State,
a duty to compensate the investor for damages arises except for those caused in the
event of state of necessity. However, the investor's fair expectations cannot fail to
consider parameters such as business risk or industry's regular patterns.' 71
b. The Return of Neer?-Bad Faith and the Threshold Approach to Fair and
Equitable Treatment
The Thunderbird tribunal addressed the question of the minimum standard of treatment
under NAFTA Article 1105 with respect to the investor's claims concerning denial of
justice and abuse of rights.' 72 After confirming the applicability of the NAFTA Free
Trade Commission's Notes of Interpretation from July 31, 2001,173 the tribunal indicated
its agreement with preceding NAFFA tribunals that "[t]he content of the minimum stan-
dard should not be rigidly interpreted and it should reflect evolving international custom-
ary law." 174
But the Thunderbird tribunal described the threshold for a breach of the minimum stan-
dard as being high, and that such acts must "amount to a gross denial of justice or manifest
arbitrariness falling below acceptable international standards." 175 Although the tribunal
did acknowledge that factually there were administrative irregularities by Mexican offi-
cials, it found that this conduct was not "grave enough to shock a sense of judicial propri-
ety and thus give rise to a breach of the minimum standard of treatment." 176 The
Thunderbird award appears to have resurrected arguments made by the NAFTA State par-
ties in earlier Chapter 11 arbitrations that Article 1105 is a minimal standard of customary
law, requiring a high level of treatment as indicated in the now universally rejected Neer
decision of 1926.177 Similarly, reliance was placed on the Genin v. Estonia award, the sub-
ject of some critical comment this past year, 17s in which the emphasis was placed on the
word minimum with respect to the treaty provisions at issue in that arbitration and the
bad faith requirement of the Neer standard.' 79
In contrast, the LG&E tribunal considered that Genin had not adopted the Neer position
that bad faith was required for a breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard 80
Similarly, the Saluka and Azurix awards, rendered a few months after the Thunderbird
award, rejected the relevance of Neer and Genin and looked to more recent cases and
171. LG&E, sttpra note 161, ' 130.
172. Thunderbird, supra note 66, 99 192-201.
173. See NAFTA Free Trade Comm'n, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions (July 31, 2001),
available at http'J/www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/Nafta-interpr-en.asp.
174. Thunderbird, supra note 66, 9 194.
175. Id. 9 194.
176. Id. 1 200.
177. See United States (L.F. Neer) v. Mexico, 4 R.I.A.A. 60 (1926) (Gen. Claims Comm'n.).
178. Azurix, supra note 162, 9 372.
179. Genin v. Estonia, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/2, 1 367 (June 25, 2001).
180. LG&E, supra note 161, 9 129.
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academic commentaries.'"' Each of the Saluka, Azurix, and LG&E tribunals have effec-
tively sided with claimants and endorsed the position that the customary international
standard has evolved such that bad faith is not a requirement of the fair and equitable
standard.
Those tribunals accordingly concluded that now there was no difference between the
treaty standard of fair and equitable treatment and the standard required by customary
international law. In the words of the Saluka tribunal, "[wihatever the merits of this con-
troversy between the parties may be, it appears that the difference between the Treaty
standard laid down in Article 3.1 and the customary minimum standard, when applied to
the specific facts of a case, may well be more apparent than real." The tribunal then added
that, "[t]o the extent that the case law reveals different formulations of the relevant thresh-
olds, an in-depth analysis may well demonstrate that they could be explained by the con-
textual and factual differences of the cases to which the standards have been applied."182
2. Non-Impairment
Provisions such as Article 3(1) of the Netherlands-Czech Investment Treaty are typical
of many BITs, providing that "each Contracting Party... shall not impair, by unreasonable
or discriminatory measures, the operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or
disposal thereof by those investors." 18 3
Tribunals considering the meaning of such provisions have noted their close connection
to the fair and equitable treatment obligation. In this vein, the Saluka tribunal opined that
a breach of the non-impairment standard "does not therefore differ substantially from a
violation of the 'fair and equitable treatment' standard." 1 4 It described the nondiscrimi-
nation standard as simply requiring "a rational justification of any differential treatment of
a foreign investor"' 8 5 and then applied this concept as part of its award, confirming a
breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard, stating that "[in particular, any differ-
ential treatment of a foreign investor must not be based on unreasonable distinctions and
demands, and must be justified by showing that it bears a reasonable relationship to ra-
tional policies not motivated by a preference for other investments over the foreign-
owned investment."' 86 This resonates with some earlier awards. 187
The LG&E tribunal stated that "[in the context of investment treaties, and the obliga-
tion thereunder not to discriminate against foreign investors, a measure is considered dis-
181. Saluka, supra note 63, at nn.18, 34, 38, 41.
182. Saluka, supra note 63, 1 291. See also Azurix, supra note 162, IT 361-72; LG&E, supra, note 161, 9 127
(citing Occidental, supra note 169, 1 185; Tecnicas Mediambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. Mexico, Award, ICSID
Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, 91 154-55, (May 29, 2003) [hereinafter Tecmed]; CMS Gas Transmission Com-
pany v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, J 279 (May 12, 2005) [hereinafter CMS].
183. See Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments Between the Kingdom of
the Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Neth.-Czech Rep., Apr. 29, 1991, available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/czechnetherlands.pdf (emphasis added).
184. Saluka, supra note 63, 461.
185. Id. 'I 460.
186. Id. 1 307.
187. For example, see MTD, supra note 110, $ 109, 114; S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award, UNCI-
TRAL, 1 162, 193 (Nov. 13, 2000); Lauder v. Czech Rep., Final Award, UNCITRAL, ' 291 (Sept. 3, 2001)
[hereinafter Lauder]; Waste Management, Inc. v. Mexico, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, 98 (Apr.
30, 2004).
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criminatory if the intent of the measure is to discriminate or if the measure has a
discriminatory effect."Is 8 The tribunal also pointed out that while the fair and equitable
treatment clause overlapped with the non-impairment clause, they were not entirely coex-
tensive. Hence, although the tribunal did not accept that the conduct of the government
was arbitrary under the non-impairment clause, it made a particular point in noting that
this did not imply the same result under the fair and equitable treatment clause.
3. Full Protection and Security
The question has arisen as to whether the standard of treatment known as full protec-
tion and security goes beyond physical protection and security by the military or police,
for example. The tribunal in Azurix indicated strongly that full protection and security
covers measures that go beyond mere physical security, including a more general obliga-
tion of due diligence.' 8 9 But the Saluka tribunal took the more restrictive, and arguably
more common view by holding that the full protection and security standard protects "the
physical integrity of an investment against interference by use of force" and "applies es-
sentially when the foreign investment has been affected by civil strife and physical vio-
lence." 90 Citing both the Teemed and Wena awards, the Saluka tribunal indicated that the
standard is not absolute and does not impose strict liability on the host State, but the host
State is obliged to exercise due diligence. 191
4. National Treatment
The claimant in Thunderbird alleged a violation of Mexico's national treatment obliga-
tion. Mexico had closed down the claimant's gaming facilities, while allegedly permitting
the similar gaming facilities of competing domestic investors to remain open. The tribu-
nal nevertheless found no breach of the national treatment obligation. The tribunal did
not adopt Mexico's position that the standard "proscribes only demonstrable and signifi-
cant indications of bias and prejudice on the basis on nationality." 9 2 Instead, it based its
decision on the fact that the illicit domestic gaming facilities were operating outside of the
knowledge and permission of Mexico.19 3 In other words, the Thunderbird tribunal appears
to have imputed the requirement into the national treatment test that the better treatment
in question must be directly attributable to the actions (as opposed to inaction) of govern-
ment officials.
5. Expropriation-A New Bright Line?
One could argue that the failed expropriation claims in the EnCana, LG&E, Saluka, and
Azurix arbitrations demonstrate investor-state arbitral tribunals' wariness of indicating
188. LG&E, supra note 153, 1 146.
189. The close interrelationship between the fair and equitable treatment standard and the full protection
and security standard is given as the main justification for this conclusion. See Azurix, supra note 162, 406-
08 (citing Occidental, supra note 169, 9 187).
190. Saluka, supra note 63, 483-84.
191. Id. (citing Tecmed, supra note 182, 177; Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Egypt, Final Award ICSID Case No.
ARB/98/4, 1 84 (Dec. 8, 2000)).
192. Thunderbird, supra note 66, 174.
193. Id. $ 180.
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state responsibility under that traditional international law delict. It would appear that
expropriation is out of fashion, if such a thing can occur in law. Of course, the results in
these recent cases may largely be due to the fact that the measures at issue are not outright
nationalizations or traditional direct expropriations with transfer of the property to gov-
ernment. Investments are often complex, and modern government regulation has become
much more subtle with respect to investors and investments. Tribunals may simply not be
prepared to label serious conduct that may otherwise be unfair and inequitable as being
expropriatory in effect. Moreover, if the government measure does not result in (accord-
ing to the often-cited phrase of the Pope & Talbot tribunal) a "substantial deprivation," 194
effectively destroying the investment, tribunals may indeed be wary of granting such a
claim.
The LG&E tribunal, largely relying on the CMS, Teemed, and Pope & Talbot analyses of
indirect expropriation, held that a claimant must be able to demonstrate that
if the conduct relates to a regulatory measure, the expropriatory act was dispropor-
tionate to the need that the measure is addressing as an exercise of the State's police
powers; 95
the economic impact of the measures have been "substantial"9 6 such that the investor
has lost control over its investment, and has been unable to direct the day-to-day
operations of the investment; 197 and
with respect to the duration of the measure, the effect of the alleged expropriatory
action has been permanent. 198
This sense of proportionality between the confiscatory measure and the legitimate need
for it is intriguing. Most BITs do not contain any exception for the exercise of regulatory
power. A possible interpretation could be, accordingly, that all takings, whether for a
public purpose or not, would be compensable. This could be called a no-fault interpreta-
tion of such a provision. On the other end of the spectrum is the argument that all tak-
ings, even if based on discriminatory or arbitrary measures, could never be compensable
because the police power is absolute.
With much the same result as the LG&E tribunal, the Saluka tribunal sailed a middle
course. It held that the deprivation of Saluka's investment by the imposition of forced
administration was justified on reasonable regulatory grounds, "notwithstanding that the
measure had the effect of eviscerating Saluka's investment."'' 9 9 It reached that conclusion
by importing the international law meaning of the term deprivation into the treaty.200
The tribunal explained that "[it] is now established in international law that States are not
liable to pay compensation to a foreign investor when, in the normal exercise of their
regulatory powers, they adopt in a nondiscriminatory manner bona fide regulations that
194. See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Interim Award, I.NCITRAL, 1 96-105 (Jan. 26, 2000) [hereinaf-
ter Pope & Talbot].
195. LG&E, supra note 161, 1 194-97.
196. Id. 190-91 (citing Pope & Talbot, supra note 194, 9J 100-02).
197. Id. $ 199; see also Azurix, supra note 162, 1 322; EnCana, supra note 74, 174.
198. LG&E, supra note 161, 11 193, 200.
199. Saluka, supra note 63, 276.
200. Id. 254.
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are aimed at the general welfare."201 But the tribunal added, the significant caveat that
international law "has yet to draw a bright and easily distinguishable line between non-
compensable regulations on the one hand and, on the other, measures that have the effect
of depriving foreign investors of their investment and are thus unlawful and compensable
in international law."
2 2
The majority in the EnCana arbitration dealt with the special issue of the indirect ex-
propriation of a legal right-in this case the right to refunds of the VAT. The tribunal
agreed with the Occidental v. Argentina tribunal that such a right could be expropriated and
that such an expropriation had not occurred in the facts of the case. 20 3
The ADC award is the one example in 2006 in which a tribunal was prepared to hold
that a State party expropriated an investment without compensation.2 04 As stated in the
award, "[i]n the opinion of the [t]ribunal, this is the clearest possible case of expropria-
tion."20 5 Because of the unambiguous nature of the expropriation of the investment in
ADC, the disputing parties were reduced to debating whether the deprivation was unlaw-
ful under the typical BIT terms 206-a matter relevant to calculation of quantum (as dis-
cussed below). The tribunal held that the expropriation was unlawful on all counts. The
expropriatory measures were not taken in the public interest nor under due process of law,
were discriminatory, and compensation was not paid.
6. Emergency Exception and Necessity
When the CME and Lauder20 7 tribunals arrived at different conclusions based on sub-
stantially the same fact pattern, a sizeable firestorm occurred in the ranks of the invest-
ment arbitration community.2 0s The question of apparently contradictory decisions by
arbitral panels has generated a great deal of discussion concerning the need for more
consistency in investment arbitration, for example, by adopting some form of appellate
mechanism. 20 9 The recent decision of the LG&E tribunal on the application of an emer-
gency exception and the customary law principle of necessity promises to ignite another
small brushfire in this continuing debate.
As in the CMS award, 2 10 the LG&E tribunal spent a considerable amount of its award
addressing the application of the necessity defense and the related emergency excep-
201. Id. 9 255.
202. Id. 1 263.
203. See EnCana, supra note 74, IT 183, 197. Note that the Occidental tribunal also rejected the investor's
claim of expropriation. See Occidental, stpra note 169.
204. Professor James Crawford, counsel for the Claimant, referred to the facts of the claim as being the
"plain hornbook law of expropriation." ADC, supra note 63, 303.
205. Id. 1 304.
206. See Agreement Between Cyprus and Hungary on the Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investments,
art. 4, Cyprus-Hung., May 24, 1989 [hereinafter Cyprus-Hungary BIT].
207. See Lauder, svpra note 187.
208. See Appeals and Challenges to Investment Treaty Awards: Is it Time for an International Appellate System?, in
INvFsTMENT-r TREATY LAW, (Ortino, Sheppard, Warner, eds., 2006), available at http://www.biicl.org.
209. See Ian Laird & Rebecca Askew, Finality Versur Consistency: Does Investor-State Arbitration Need an Appel-
late System?, 7 J. App. PRAC. & PRocEvss, 285 (2005).
210. CMS, supra note 182 IT 304-94.
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tion.2 11 But unlike the CMS tribunal, the LG&E tribunal factually determined that, under
the provisions of the BIT and international law, 2'2 a state of necessity indeed existed dur-
ing the economic crisis for a seventeen-month period from late 2001 to early 2003. As a
result, the LG&E tribunal held that Argentina was exempt from responsibility during that
period and that any liability for damages did not begin to accrue until after spring 2003.
The full implications of this element of the LG&E merits award will have to wait for the
damages decision of the tribunal.
Similar to the CMS tribunal, the LG&E tribunal did determine that Article XI of the
BIT213 was not a self-judging provision.2 14 Also, both tribunals agreed that an economic
crisis could be considered as relating to an "essential security interest." 215 But unlike the
CMS tribunal, 2 16 the LG&E tribunal made a factual finding that the peso crisis, although
not ultimately catastrophic, was sufficiently severe to come under the emergency excep-
tion. 217 The LG&E tribunal also disagreed with the CMS tribunal that there was suffi-




Two tribunals granted substantial damages awards in 2006: ADC v. Hungary and Azurix
v. Argentina.
1. Unlawfid Expropriation
The question of whether the expropriation in ADC was lawful was the key issue because
the relevant BIT did not provide a valuation standard for unlawful expropriation. The
standard set forth in Article 4(1)(a) of the Cyprus-Hungary BIT refers to "just compensa-
tion" for a lawful expropriation under Article 4(1).219
211. LG&E, slpra note 161, 1 201-65. Note also that the emergency exception was not an issue in the
Azurix arbitration as the key events in that claim occurred prior to 2001. See Azurix, sapra note 162, 1 57.
212. Article 25 of the International Law Commissions Articles on State Responsibility, titled Necessity, is
considered to be a complete statement of the customary international law on the subject. See JAMES CRAW-
FORD, INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY: INRODUCIiON, Ti.IT
AND COMME'NARiES (2002).
213. See US-Argentina Bilateral Investment Treaty art. XI, U.S.-Arg., Nov. 14, 1991 ("This Treaty shall not
preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfill-
ment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or
the protection of its own essential security interests.").
214. LG&E, spra note 161, 1 212.
215. Id. 1 251; CMS, svpra note 182, 319.
216. Which concluded that the economic crisis was not sufficiently catastrophic to meet the standard. See
CMS, supra note 182, 9 359-61.
217. LG&E, snpra note 161, 238. Similarly, the LG&E tribunal (IT 239-42) rejected the argument, ac-
cepted by the CMS tribunal, that there were alternative means for the Government to respond to the crisis.
See CMS, supra note 182, 323-24.
218. LG&E, sitpra note 161, J 256-57. Under Article 25(2)(b) if the ILC Articles on State Responsibility,
necessity cannot be invoked if "the [sltate has contributed to the situation of necessity." The CMS Tribunal
decided that Argentina had contributed to the crisis and thus prevented the invocation of necessity. See CMS,
supra note 182 1329.
219. Cyprus-Hungary BIT, supra note 206, art. 4 ("2. The amount of compensation must correspond to the
market value of the expropriated investments at the moment of the expropriation. 3. The amount of this
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Hungary argued for the application of Hungarian law. But because the expropriation
was unlawful, the tribunal held that the Article 4(2) standard, which only applied to a
lawful expropriation, would not apply. Accordingly, the default was held to be the cus-
tomarv international law standard for unlawful expropriation. 220 The tribunal gave a
lengthy dissertation 221 in support of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)
decision in the Chorzow Factory case as the statement of the customary international law
standard for the assessment of damages resulting from an -unlawful act. The key part of
the decision of the PCIJ reads "reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the conse-
quences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability,
have existed if that act had not been committed.1 222
The most interesting element of the ADC award is that the tribunal set the date of
valuation to be the date of award. Typically, the valuation date for expropriation claims is
the date of the expropriation. But an issue arose in the arbitration because of the fact that
the value of the investment significantly increased after the date of expropriation. The
tribunal accepted the claimant's argument that, to fully meet the principle set out in
Chorzow Factory (to put the claimants in the same position but for the unlawful expropria-
tion), the date of the award and not the date of expropriation would be most appropri-
ate.223 In addition, the tribunal accepted the claimant's submissions that the discounted
cash flow approach should be used to determine the fair market value of the unlawfully
expropriated investment in that case. 224
The Azurix tribunal was faced with considering damages for breaches of fair and equita-
ble treatment, full protection and security, and impairment of the investment through
arbitrariness. Although it rejected the expropriation claim, as the CMS tribunal did, the
Azurix tribunal applied a methodology consistent with a fair market value approach used
in determination of compensation for expropriation.2 5 The tribunal indicated that the
date for determining the valuation would be set in the following manner: "in assessing fair
market value, a tribunal would establish that value in a hypothetical context where the
State would not have resorted to such maneuvers but would have fully respected the provi-
sions of the treaty and the contract concerned." 226 With respect to the award of interest,
both the ADC and Azurix tribunals followed the increasing trend in investment arbitration
to award compound interest. 227
2. Costs
The practice in investor-state arbitrations with respect to the award of costs appears to
have become somewhat inconsistent. In the past, decisions on costs in investor-state arbi-
compensation may be estimated according to the laws and regulations of the country where the expropriation
is made.")
220. ADC, supra note 63, 1$ 480-83.
221. Id. 11 484-95.
222. i. 1 489 (citing Germany v. Poland, 17 P.C.Ij. (set. A) No. 3, at 47 (Chorz6w Factory case)).
223. ADC, supra note 63, 497-500.
224. Id. It 501-04.
225. Azurix, supra note 162, 420, 424 (citing CMS, supra note 182, 410).
226. Id. 1 417 (citing Compafiia del Dessarollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v. Costa Rica, Award, ICSID Case No.
ARB/96/1 (2000)).
227. Id. 440.
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tration have for the most part resulted in parties bearing their own costs with respect to
counsel fees and the arbitration expenses, except in the case of spurious claims or bad-faith
litigation tactics. The practice of each party bearing its own costs was most recently fol-
lowed in Salini, although Arbitrator Sinclair dissented on this point by suggesting that
there should be some consideration of the loser pays principle. 2 8
But following a new trend perhaps set in motion by the Methanex v. U.S. tribunal in
2005,229 arbitral tribunals appear to now be more inclined to follow the so-called principle
set out in Article 40 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and consider awarding costs in
favor of the successful party. This is occurring even under ICSID arbitrations, such as the
ADC and Telenor arbitrations, which are not subject to the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules. 230 Another example is the Thunderbird arbitration, under the UNCITRAL Rules,
in which the tribunal awarded three quarters of the counsel and arbitration costs against
the unsuccessful claimant, although there was a lengthy and detailed dissent from co-
arbitrator Professor WAlde.
Some tribunals have taken the opportunity in their award of costs to draw attention to
the questionable conduct of one or both of the disputing parties. For example, in the
EnCana award, where the claims of the investor were denied, the tribunal clearly wished to
make a point when it held that the costs of the arbitration were to be paid by the success-
ful respondent, while each party would bear its own costs with respect to counsel repre-
sentation.23' The Azurix tribunal awarded arbitration costs against the unsuccessful
respondent, but indicated that counsel fees were to be borne equally by each disputing
party. 232 In ADC, the tribunal particularly noted the poor conduct of Hungary prior to
and during the arbitration as justification for a full counsel and arbitration cost award
against it as the unsuccessful party.233
E. ANNULMENT AND SET ASIDE AcTiONS
The year 2006 brought some developments in the protracted challenge of the Occidental
v. Ecuador award of July 1, 2004. During the arbitration, Occidental argued that it was
entitled to VAT refunds in excess of $75 million on goods and services purchased in con-
nection with its exploration activities in Ecuador. In its award, the tribunal found that in
failing to refund those amounts, Ecuador had breached several standards of protection set
forth in the U.S.-Ecuador BIT, most notably, the fair and equitable treatment standard.
228. See Salini, supra note 163 $j9n 101-04; see also World Duty Free, supra note 90, T 190 (parties ordered to
bear costs equally despite "the general practice in transnational arbitration that the successful party under an
award should recover its legal costs, i.e., its own costs and expenses reasonably incurred in those arbitration
proceedings").
229. See Methanex v. United States, Award, UNCITRAL (2005). For other examples of costs following the
event, see Telenor Mobile Coinmunic'n A.S. v. Hungary, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15, T 107 (Sep. 13,
2006); see also Inceysa Vallisoletana, S.L. v. El Salvador, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/26 (Aug. 2, 2006),
available at htp://www.investnentclaims.coiidecisions/El%20Salvador%2CSID%2OAward%2ODescrip-
tion.pdf.
230. Under the ICSID Convention Article 61(2) and ICSID Arbitration Rule 28, wide discretion is in fact
provided to tribunals regarding costs and no mention is made of a principle in favor of the successful party.
231. EnCana, supra note 74, 202
232. Azurix, supra note 162, 441.
233. ADC, supra note 63, 9] 525-42.
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Shortly after the award was entered, Ecuador appealed to the English courts (London
was the seat of arbitration) on grounds that tax matters were not covered by the U.S.-
Ecuador BIT, and therefore could not be adjudicated by an arbitral tribunal constituted
under that BIT.
On September 9, 2005, the Queen's Bench Division dismissed Occidental's contentions
that the dispute was not justiciable in English court because it involved relations between
two foreign sovereigns. The court consequently allowed Ecuador's appeal to proceed. 234
In December 2005, Ecuador's appeal was heard by the Queen's Bench Division, which
issued a decision on the matter on March 2, 2006. In its ruling, the Queen's Bench Divi-
sion rejected Ecuador's request to set aside the award.2 35 The Court found that, while the
dispute between the parties might present some tax-related aspects, it was not a tax matter.
Instead, it was a case on whether Ecuador had interfered with the regular performance of
the parties' obligations under the exploration contract. As such, the dispute was covered
by the U.S.-Ecuador BIT. Further, the Court stated that, as a result of the award, Ecua-
dor had suffered no "substantial injustice." 236
V. Institutional Developments
A. AAA INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), a division of the AAA, has
amended its International Arbitration Rules (ICDR-IAR), effective May 1, 2006, to in-
clude a new rule providing for the appointment of an emergency arbitrator to take up
requests for relief needed prior to the formation of the arbitration panel. The rule, Article
37, is included by default in standard arbitration rules.
The rule fills an important need. Previously, a party with a need for emergency relief
prior to the formation of the entire arbitral tribunal had no choice but to pursue interim
relief in the courts. But judicial relief may be unavailable, such as in United States juris-
dictions that have held that they lack power to grant interim relief where the underlying
dispute is subject to an arbitration agreement. 237 In some cases, the inability to obtain
emergency relief could be so serious as to render moot any eventual remedy the arbitra-
tors offered. Moreover, seeking emergency interim relief from a court in an international
case could frustrate the expectation of a neutral forum because the court with jurisdiction
over the party to be restrained is likely to be in that party's home country.
Article 37 provides for the appointment of an emergency arbitrator within one business
day of a request. The emergency procedure is automatically available where the parties
have called for arbitration under the ICDR-IAR, unless the parties expressly opt-out.
234. See Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Ecuador, [20051 EWCA (Civ) 1116 (Eng.).
235. See Ecuador v. Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co., [20061 EWHC (Comm) 345 (Eng.).
236. Id. 1 121.
237. See, e.g., McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT S.pA, 501 F.2d 1032 (3d Cir. 1974); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. McCollum, 666 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1127 (1985). New York state courts were under a similar limitation imposed by
the New York Court of Appeals decision in Cooper v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, S., 442 N.E.2d 1239
(N.Y. 1982). But in 2005 the New York legislature amended New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules, al-
lowing courts to provide interim relief in support of international arbitration. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. Section
7502(c) (McKinney 2005).
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This favorably distinguishes it from other opt-in mechanisms for obtaining interim relief,
which are seldom used. It requires notice of the application for the appointment of an
emergency arbitrator be given to all parties an opportunity to be heard. Article 37 makes
no provision for ex parte applications for emergency relief. The rule applies prospectively
from May 1, 2006, based on the date of the parties' agreement to arbitrate.
B. UNCITRAL
The United Nations Commission of International Trade Law, at the thirty-ninth ses-
sion of the Commission held in New York from June 19 to July 7, 2006, adopted two
significant revisions to the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbi-
tration (Model Law).2 38
First, the Commission expanded the Model Law's definition of agreements to arbitrate
and provided States with two alternative texts. The first option requires that arbitration
agreements "be in writing," but allows the requirement to be satisfied if the agreement's
content is "recorded in any form, whether or not the arbitration agreement or contract
has been concluded orally, by conduct, or by other means." 2 39 The second option omits
the writing requirement altogether and deems sufficient any agreement to arbitrate dis-
putes arising from a defined legal relationship.2 40 The Commission also issued a recom-
mendation regarding the interpretation of the New York Convention that is consistent
with this expanded notion of agreements to arbitrate.241
Second, the revised Model Law clarifies and expands arbitral tribunals' power to issue
provisional measures. Under the revised Model Law, tribunals may grant interim mea-
sures unless the parties have agreed otherwise, 242 and may issue a preliminary order-a
temporary form of interim relief-without notice to the non-requesting party if prior
disclosure would risk frustrating the purpose of the order.2 4 3 Preliminary orders expire
after twenty days, and are binding on the parties but are not enforceable in court.24 4
C. ICSID RULES AMENDMENTS
On April 10, 2006, an amended version of the ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitra-
tion Proceedings (Arbitration Rules) entered into force.245 While the amendments are
238. UNCITRAL, Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of its Thirty-
Ninth Session, Supplement No. 17, A/61/17 (June 19-July 7, 2006), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/
UNDOC/GEN/VO6/558/15/PDF/V0655815.pdPOpenElement.
239. Id. at Annex 1, art. 7, pp. 56-57.
240. Id.
241. Id. at Annex II: Recommendation Regarding the Interpretation of Article II, Paragraph 2, and Article
VH, Paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Done
in New York, 10 June 1958, Adopted by the United Nations Commission of International Trade Law on 7
July 2006 at Its Thirty-Ninth Session.
242. Id. at Annex I, art. 17.
243. Id. at art. 17B(l)-(2).
244. Id. at art. 17C(4)-(5).
245. The amended Arbitration Rules apply only to claims brought under ICSID arbitration agreements
entered on or after April 10, 2006. With respect to claims brought under Bilateral Investment Treaties, all
BIT-based arbitration requests submitted on or after April 10, 2006 shall be dealt with under the amended
Arbitration Rules, irrespective of the date when the BIT entered into force. ICSID, Rules of Procedure for
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few in number, their impact is profound. This section discusses the most relevant changes
brought about by the amendments.
1. Expansion of Arbitrator Disclosure Requirements
Upon their appointment, arbitrators in ICSID proceedings are required to disclose any
"past and present" relationship with the parties, as well as "any other circumstance that
might" raise questions about their independence.246 Under the revised Arbitration Rules,
the arbitrator's duty to disclose events which might raise questions about their indepen-
dence continues throughout the proceeding, even if those events take place after their
appointment. This revision brings the ICSID Arbitration Rules into line with the rules of
other major international arbitration institutions.
2. Facilitation of Interim Relief Measures
The revised Arbitration Rules allow parties to seek interim relief before an arbitral tri-
bunal is constituted. A party can seek provisional measures for the preservation of its
rights "at any time after the institution of the proceeding," 247 although requests will not
be considered until after the tribunal is constituted.2 4 8 Albeit a step forward, the new
ICSID framework on interim relief still leaves a very serious deficiency in ICSID arbitra-
tion, especially given the length of time it often takes ICSID to constitute a tribunal.
3. Preliminary Objections Allowed
A respondent can now raise a preliminary objection "that a claim is manifestly without
legal merit," 249 similar to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6) of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The tribunal is expected to rule on
the objection "at its first session or promptly thereafter."
4. Transparency and Third-Party Involvement Enhanced
The Arbitration Rules introduced three innovations that seek to promote transparency
in ICSID arbitration and facilitate the participation of third-parties, thereby emphasizing
the public nature of ICSID proceedings and making them look less like traditional com-
mercial arbitration.
First, ICSID arbitration hearings may now be public, unless either party objects and
upon consultation with the Secretary General. 250 In the event that a hearing is public,
Arbitration Proceedings (2006), http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/partF.htm [hereinafter Arbitration
Rules].
246. Id. at Rule 6(2).
247. Id. at Rule 39(1).
248. Id. at Rule 39(5).
249. Id. at Rule 41(5).
250. Id. at Rule 32. Both in ICSID and UNCITRAL arbitrations, each party retains the power to veto public
hearings. See UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976), Rule 25(4), http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/un.
arbitration.rules. 1976/ (requiring that "hearings shall be held in camera unless the parties agree otherwise").
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"the [t]ribunal shall ... establish procedures for the protection of proprietary or privileged
information."
25 1
Second, the publication of excerpts from ICSID awards is now mandatory. Notwith-
standing the general rule that awards cannot be published in full without the parties' con-
sent, ICSID must "promptly include" excerpts of awards-limited to the tribunal's "legal
reasoning"-in its publications.2 52
Third, the Arbitration Rules now provide some guidance for dealing with increasingly
frequent requests for the submission of amicus briefs. The arbitral tribunal can admit
amicus curiae submissions even if the parties object to them, though it must give the
parties the opportunity to present their observations. In determining whether to allow an
amicus curiae submission, the tribunal must consider, among other things, the extent to
which the submission would address a matter within the scope of the dispute, whether it
would assist the tribunal by offering knowledge or a perspective different from that of the
disputing parties, and whether the party has a significant interest in the proceeding.25 3
With the enactment of the amended Arbitration Rules, ICSID arbitration has imported
many court-litigation techniques and has become less party-centered. Yet, its popularity
continues to grow. In 2006, ICSID was expected to register over twenty new claims, and a
similar number of BITs containing consents to ICSID arbitration were expected to enter
into force.254
D. CAFTA
An increasing number of multilateral investment treaties now incorporate consents to
ICSID arbitration. 255 One of those treaties is the Central America-Dominican Republic-
United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA).256 In 2006, CAFTA entered into force
between the United States and El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. The
Dominican Republic is expected to implement CAFTA before the end of 2006, and the
final hold-out, Costa Rica, is expected to do so in early 2007.
The guarantees afforded by CAFTA to investors from one contracting State doing busi-
ness in another contracting State are inspired by those laid out in the U.S. Model BIT, as
well as in the U.S. free trade agreements with Chile and Singapore. They include national
treatment and most-favored nation treatment, fair and equitable treatment protection
under customary international law, nondiscriminatory treatment in case of armed conflict
or civil strife, protection against expropriation and nationalization, entitlement to transfer
investment-related capital freely and without delay into and out of the investment host
State, release from performance requirements in order to maintain the investment in the
investment host State, release from nationality requirements for senior management or
251. Arbitration Rules, spra note 245, at Rule 32. A similar provision has been introduced in Rule 39(2) of
the AF Rules.
252. Id. at Rule 48(4).
253. Id. at Rule 37(2).
254. See cases registered by ICSID during 2006 at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pending.htin.
255. See Christoph Schreuer, "Traveling the BIT Route: Of Waiting Periods, Umbrella Clauses, and Forks
in the Road," 5 J. W. Inv. & Trade 231, 231-33 (2004).
256. See CAFTA art. 10.17.
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boards of directors, and a requirement that the investment host State observe all obliga-
tions laid down in investment agreements the State may have entered into.
In case of a dispute between the investor and the investment host State, the investor
must exhaust a consulting and negotiation period with the State. The investor then can
institute international arbitration proceedings against the State, either before ICSID or
under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. Unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, the
dispute shall be resolved by three arbitrators in accordance with CAFTA provisions and
the "applicable rules of international law." 257 The domestic law of the respondent State
can also apply, unless superseded (or prohibited) by CAFTA.
257. Id. at art. 1.22(1).
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